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Abstract
Individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptoms often struggle with heightened
sensitivity and arousal in response to perceived threats. Moreover, interpersonal dysfunction in
GAD has become increasingly a focus of empirical investigation and treatment, given the
possibility that responses to social interactions may contribute to GAD symptom maintenance.
Laboratory studies and cross-sectional trait assessments of interpersonal problems comprise most
of our understanding of interpersonal dysfunction in GAD. However, how GAD symptoms
interact with perceived interpersonal threats to predict affective responses (increased arousal,
lower valence) within daily life remains poorly understood. Therefore, the purpose of the present
study was to examine effects of in vivo social perceptions on state affect, and how GAD
symptoms may moderate those relationships. Participants (N = 161) completed baseline
measures of trait GAD and depression symptoms (as a covariate). Then participants completed
30 social interaction surveys over the subsequent 10 days. In each survey, participants rated
interaction partners’ dominant, cold, and immoral behavior (each conceptualized as interpersonal
threats) as well as their own arousal and valence in response to the behavior. Multilevel
modeling analyses of between- and within-person effects revealed that mean perceptions of cold
and immoral behavior predicted higher arousal and lower valence as hypothesized, whereas
mean perceived dominance unexpectedly predicted only lower valence. All within-person
fluctuations in social perceptions predicted both higher arousal and lower valence. Regarding the
moderating effects, GAD symptoms unexpectedly buffered the effect of average perceived cold
behavior on valence and strengthened the effect of average perceived immoral behavior on
valence. These results provide a deeper understanding of how social perceptions may contribute
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to affect in naturalistic interactions, and add to the literature on interpersonal correlates of GAD
symptoms.

Keywords: generalized anxiety disorder, morality, interpersonal circumplex, whole trait theory,
threat perception
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CHAPTER I
Introduction and Literature Review
Overview
The excessive and uncontrollable worry and hyperarousal symptoms of Generalized
Anxiety Disorder (GAD) range from “normal” to pathological and contribute to distress and
functional impairment in individuals of all ages. However, the current best interventions for
treating GAD symptoms are only effective for about 50% of individuals at post-treatment
follow-up (Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 2013). As such, research on GAD symptoms has
increasingly focused on better understanding underlying processes that may be targeted in
treatment, such as biases toward perceived threats, affective reactivity, and specific domains of
dysfunction, such as interpersonal relationships. However, scant research exists that examines
dynamic state processes that explain trait GAD symptoms in the context of specific interpersonal
interactions in daily life. The existing research in this area is limited by its focus on trait-level
tendencies to explain trait GAD symptoms. Much less is known about variable, state-level, daily
interpersonal processes in individuals with GAD symptoms, which may better explain how GAD
symptoms are maintained over time.
Whole Trait Theory (WTT; Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015) is a recently-developed
theory which posits that understanding a ‘whole trait’ or individual difference variable – like
GAD symptoms – is possible by examining it at both the stable, trait level and the variable,
within-person state level. WTT asserts that there is an inseparable link between the broad
description of a given trait and its varied expression across situations. For instance, having high
levels of a trait such as neuroticism reflects both 1) a description of the person’s average level of
negative emotionality over time compared to other people and 2) a predictable pattern of within-
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person variability in the expressed level of negative emotional states, which may fluctuate
around the person’s mean level response to characteristics of a given situation. Therefore, in the
present investigation, better understanding how the state-level perception of threats and affective
reactivity occur in daily interpersonal interactions will inform our understanding of trait GAD
symptoms more broadly.
The Interpersonal Circumplex (IPC; Wiggins, 1982), which conceptualizes social
behaviors along dimensions of dominance (ranging from dominance to submission) and
affiliation (ranging from close, socializing behavior to distancing behavior), provides a basic
framework for considering interpersonal perceptions of threats in daily social interactions. These
two dimensions appear to capture substantial variance in the domain of interpersonal behavior,
permitting researchers to categorize behaviors and predict behaviors within social interactions
(see Pincus & Ansell, 2003 for a review). However, recent theory and research suggests that it
may be important to also examine a third social-cognitive or interpersonal dimension
representing perceived morality, as this clearly contributes unique variability in perceptions of
others’ behaviors (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Haidt, 2003; Haidt, 2006).
In addition to circumplex descriptions of behavior, an individual’s affective reaction to
another person’s interpersonal behavior helps us understand what meaning was ascribed to the
other person’s behavior. For instance, negative affect and arousal are typically associated with
the perception of threats (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1982). Although GAD theory and
research has assumed that negative social information represent threats (i.e., angry faces; Mogg,
Millar, & Bradley, 2000; Verkuil et al., 2009), further research is needed to better understand
how specific IPC behaviors may function as daily interpersonal threats to people with different
levels of self-reported GAD symptoms. Therefore, the present study aims to examine how
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perceptions of others’ behavior in terms of dominance, affiliation, and morality dimensions
during social interactions may predict negative affect and arousal, as well as whether individuals
high in GAD symptoms have stronger within-person associations between perceived social
threats and affective response. Before describing the details of the present study, I will review
relevant literatures on GAD, Whole Trait Theory, and the Interpersonal Circumplex.
Background
Generalized Anxiety Disorder
Core Symptoms
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is characterized by excessive and uncontrollable
worry about several life domains (e.g., daily to-dos, finances, interpersonal relationships, health
of family members; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Worry is a cognitive
process that involves repetitive thinking about anticipated negative events (Borkovec, Robinson,
Pruzinksy, & DePree, 1983). The form of worry has been theorized to be primarily abstract
verbal-linguistic cognitions (e.g., “What if my classmate rejects me?”; Borkovec, Alcaine, &
Behar, 2004), but may also include mental imagery (e.g., mentally picturing being rejected by a
classmate; Bergman & Craske, 2000; Skodzik et al., 2016). To receive a diagnosis of GAD, the
dysfunctional worry needs to occur nearly every day over the course of six months and must be
accompanied by at least three somatic symptoms that are associated with physiological arousal,
including: restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge, being easily fatigued, difficulty
concentrating or mind going blank, irritability, muscle tension, and sleep disturbance (APA,
2013). Thus, broadly speaking, GAD involves problems with negative anticipatory thinking that
coincides with overactive physiological arousal.
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GAD Symptoms Are Prevalent and Disabling
Regarding GAD symptom prevalence and disability, most of the available data are based
on estimates from people with diagnosable GAD. Prevalence estimates suggest that 1.6% to
5.0% of the population suffered from GAD over the past year (Kessler et al., 2005: Kessler,
Keller, & Wittchen, 2001; Moffitt et al., 2010; Wittchen, Zhao, Kessler, & Eaton, 1994), and that
an estimated 14.2% of people will develop GAD at some point in their life (Moffitt et al., 2010).
Around 56% of individuals with GAD reported having severe disabilities (Kessler et al., 2009),
37% relied on public assistance, and 50% lacked full-time employment (Massion et al., 1993).
Having GAD has been associated with increased functional impairment over preceding 3
months, increased number of physician visits, and decreased health-related quality of life (Dear
et al., 2011). Furthermore, people with GAD tended to endorse lasting interpersonal conflicts
(Judd et al., 1998), report low marital satisfaction (Whisman, 2007), were less likely to be
married, experienced more life events and greater financial problems, and reported more
disability and distress (Goncalves & Byrne, 2012). Gentes and Ruscio (2014) conducted a study
that identified disabilities relevant to GAD symptoms, regardless of diagnostic status. They
found that compared to individuals with non-distressing levels of worry, people with GAD and
even worriers who did not meet full GAD criteria reported more disruptions in schoolwork,
social life, family/home life, number of days lost and unproductivity due to worry symptoms.
Thus, these individuals experience significant distress and dysfunction, particularly in the
interpersonal domain.
Across psychiatric disorders, having comorbid diagnoses is often associated with
increased distress and functional impairment (Williams & Egede, 2016), and GAD is frequently
comorbid with other psychiatric disorders (e.g., Bruce et al., 2005). For instance, GAD was
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found to be comorbid with a mood or personality disorder in 89.8% of individuals over the past
12 months (Grant et al., 2005), with Major Depressive Disorder or dysthymia (i.e., Persistent
Depressive Disorder) in 36% of individuals (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill,
2001), and with panic disorder and social anxiety disorder in 23% of individuals (Beesdo, Pine,
Lieb, & Wittchen, 2010). Thus, individuals with GAD symptoms are prone to endorsing a range
of other symptoms or comorbid disorders, suggesting further evidence of impairment.
GAD Symptoms as Dimensional
Although GAD is a formal diagnosis, GAD symptoms may be conceptualized as a
dimensional, continuous variable rather than dichotomous factor (i.e., presence of GAD
diagnosis or not). Despite evidence linking diagnosable GAD to impairment, its core cognitive
features and symptoms occur on a broad spectrum. First, worry is a normative cognitive process
(Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001) engaged by people of all ages (Miloyan, Byrne, & Pachana,
2014; Olatunji, Broman-Fulks, Bergman, Green & Zlomke, 2010; Wilson, 2010). Second, the
more a person worries (even at subclinical levels), the more psychological distress they tend to
experience (Goncalves & Byrne, 2012). Finally, having high levels of worry does not always
mean that the person would meet full criteria for a formal diagnosis of GAD (Ruscio et al.,
2001). For instance, results of two taxometric analyses suggest that worry constitutes a single
dimensional factor, rather than dichotomous factors that would otherwise distinguish “normal”
from pathological worriers (Olatunji et al., 2010; Ruscio et al., 2001). Furthermore, in a sample
of 3,486 worriers aged 18 to 98 years, about 987 (28.3%) of the participants met screening
criteria for Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) in the past 12 months (Miloyan, Byrne, &
Pachana, 2014). However, researching only the individuals who surpassed the threshold for
clinical-levels of GAD symptoms impedes our understanding of the processes behind GAD
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symptoms in general. Therefore, it seems prudent to measure GAD symptoms as a continuous
variable to understand its linear relationship to other continuous variables and provide findings
that are relevant to a wide variety of GAD symptomatology.
Core Processes of GAD: Threat Sensitivity and Affective Reactivity
Given the negative impact of trait-like GAD symptoms in people’s lives, it is important
to understand core underlying processes that may be targets for psychological interventions. Two
cognitive-affective processes that appear to be central to individuals high in GAD symptoms
include: 1) a heightened sensitivity to perceiving threats (Goodwin, Yiend, & Hirsch, 2017;
Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) and 2) tendencies to react to perceived threats with greater negative
affect and arousal (Aldao, Mennin, Linardatos, & Fresco, 2010; Hoffman et al., 2005; Stapinski,
Abbott, & Rapee, 2010). Threats may be defined as “any object, person or event (internal or
external) that might endanger one’s physical health or psychological wellbeing” (Arnaudova et
al., 2017, p. 4). These can include environmental threats (e.g., a cliff’s edge) or social threats
(e.g., picture of an angry face; Dolan & Vuillemier, 2003; Monk et al., 2008; Sutherland,
Oldmeadow, & Young, 2016). Furthermore, perceiving something as a threat means that the
individual assumes a negative outcome is both probable and costly (Berenbaum, Thompson, &
Bredemeier, 2007).
Research has shown that people with GAD symptoms have heightened neurological
sensitivities to perceiving threats (Stout, Shackman, Pedersen, Miskovich, & Larson, 2017) and
sustained threat processing (Burkhouse, Woody, Owens, & Gibb, 2015), attentional biases
toward threat (Goodwin et al., 2017b; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014), and tendencies to interpret
neutral or ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Gole et al., 2012; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994;
Verkuil et al., 2009). This research suggests a linear relationship between GAD symptoms and
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sensitivity to interpersonal threats, such that higher symptoms may be associated with higher
sensitivity.
However, research on threat perception in GAD has been conducted almost entirely in
laboratory settings in which participants were tested for their implicit and self-reported reactions
to negatively-valenced stimuli (e.g., Stapinski et al., 2010; Zainal & Newman, 2017). Only two
studies were found that examined the effect of GAD symptoms on naturalistic, daily reports of
negative contrasts, which are threatening experiences of sudden shifts into negative moods
(Crouch, Lewis, Erickson, & Newman, 2017; Newman et al., 2019). These studies were limited,
however, by the fact that they did not examine specific domains of naturalistic interpersonal
behavior that may be perceived as threatening in participants’ daily lives. Furthermore, it
remains unclear whether individuals with high levels of GAD symptoms would perceive
specific, naturalistic interpersonal behaviors (e.g., dominance, coldness, morally disgusting) as
threatening, and whether they would perceive these behaviors as more threatening than
individuals with low levels of trait GAD symptoms.
Regarding the second core process in GAD (i.e., affective reactivity), individuals with
GAD symptoms tend to show heightened physiological arousal in response to perceived threats.
In humans, perceiving a threat is associated with a rapid increase in physiological arousal and
negative affect (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1982). This reaction serves to signal the presence
of threat to the organism and prepare the body to respond to the threat and maximize chances for
survival (Kemeny, 2003; Lange & James, 1922). However, this process appears to be
dysfunctional in individuals with increased GAD symptoms, as GAD has been theorized to cause
greater reactivity toward threats (Newman et al,. 2013). For instance, worrying is associated with
increased physiological arousal, as suggested by increased skin conductance response (Ottaviani
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et al., 2014; Stapinski et al., 2010), increased heart rate (Hoffman et al., 2005), and decreased
heart rate variability (Aldao, Mennin, & McLaughlin, 2013) in response to perceived or
anticipated threats. Furthermore, even when compared to individuals with unipolar depression,
individuals with GAD symptoms self-reported higher levels of trait emotion intensity and
affective reactivity (Aldao et al., 2010). As such, we would expect GAD symptoms, rather than
depression symptoms, to be associated with heightened affective reactivity to perceived threats
in daily, naturalistic situations. Prior research has shown that depressed participants tend to
report less arousal in response to negative stimuli compared to anxious participants and
participants with comorbid anxiety and depression (Rosebrock, Hoxha, Norris, Cacioppo, &
Gollan, 2016). Furthermore, while participants diagnosed with an anxiety disorder showed
heightened startle response to aversive stimuli compared to healthy controls, participants with
comorbid depression and anxiety disorders showed blunted startle response (Yancey,
Vaidyanathan, & Patrick, 2014). Therefore, we would expect that, in situations that are likely to
be perceived as threatening to people in general, individuals with depression symptoms might
show less affective reactivity, whereas individuals with GAD symptoms are likely to exhibit
greater affective reactivity.
Interventions for GAD symptoms often target these two processes to help the individual
manage threat perceptions as well as track and reduce negative affect (Szkodny, Newman, &
Goldfried, 2014; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014); for instance, cognitive interventions attempt to
help individuals reduce catastrophic interpretations of events and applied relaxation can help
them reduce anxious arousal and tension. However, current evidence-based treatments for GAD
yield limited treatment response (Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 2013), indicating a clear
need for research to better understand how GAD symptoms contribute to dysfunction. Therefore,
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better understanding how perception of threat and affective reactivity show up in daily
interactions may uncover specific targets for treatment that help to improve outcomes.
The Need to Study GAD-Relevant Interpersonal Processes Specifically
Interpersonal dysfunction in GAD is an understudied context for threat perception and
distress. Ample evidence implicates a that individuals high in GAD symptoms may be sensitive
to perceiving threats in the interpersonal domain. For instance, people with GAD often report
that interpersonal concerns are one of their most commonly endorsed worries (Breitholtz,
Johansson, & Ost, 1995; Goncalves & Byrne, 2012; Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997).
People with clinical levels of worry are susceptible to heightened interpersonal sensitivity
(Gasperini, Battaglia, Daferia, & Bellodi, 1990; Hoehn-Saric et al., 1993; Mavissakalian,
Hamann, Haidar, & de Groot, 1995; Nisita et al., 1990) and negatively biased perceptions of
social information (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992).
Furthermore, GAD is associated with a range of self-reported interpersonal problems
(Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008).
For instance, cluster analyses (Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008) have identified
heterogeneous self-reported interpersonal problems among individuals with GAD. Across
multiple studies, these participants with GAD varied in terms of what predominant types of
interpersonal problems they most strongly endorsed, including being too intrusive, exploitable,
nonassertive, or cold. If GAD symptoms are associated with a variety of interpersonal problems,
then it is important to further tease apart factors that contribute to these differences, whether
trait- or state-level differences. Przeworski and colleagues (2011) found that the different
interpersonal clusters of participants did not differ in their level of distress, attachment problems,
or comorbid Axis I diagnoses, but differed in whether they had a comorbid personality disorder
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diagnosis. In the authors’ second study, about 68% of the individuals with GAD had a comorbid
personality disorder. Given that personality disorders are associated with patterns of
interpersonal dysfunction (Pincus & Hopwood, 2012) that include trait-like biased perceptions of
others and strong affective reactions to others’ interpersonal behaviors (e.g., Berenson, Downey,
Rafaeli, Coifman, & Paquin, 2011), the overlap with GAD warrants additional research to
identify patterns of interpersonal dysfunction in individuals with GAD symptoms at not only trait
but particularly the state level.
If considering possible daily interpersonal tendencies, another point that remains unclear
from the two cluster analysis studies (Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008) is regarding
which interpersonal behaviors individuals with GAD would react to with the most intense
negative affect and arousal. Because each of the clusters of interpersonal problems (i.e.,
intrusive, exploitable, nonassertive, or cold) varied in levels of dominance and affiliation, it
needs to be understood whether individuals with GAD symptoms would be particularly prone to
experiencing high arousal and negative affect in response to specific kinds of daily interpersonal
behaviors.
One sizeable limitation of the extant research on GAD symptoms and interpersonal
dysfunction is that the findings primarily consist of general trait-like tendencies found in crosssectional studies (e.g., one-time self-reports or lab interactions) that are presumed to hold
constant across interpersonal interactions. Given assertions that specific ongoing patterns of
behaviors in interpersonal interactions may maintain psychopathology (Carson, 1991; Horowitz,
2004; Safran & Segal., 1990), it is surprising that few studies have specifically examined
situation-specific, dynamically varying interpersonal processes in individuals with GAD
symptoms. Recent research has examined daily interpersonal patterns associated with other
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psychiatric disorders (e.g., borderline personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder;
Sadikaj, Moskowitz, Russell, Zuroff, & Paris, 2013; Scott et al., 2017, respectively) and
maladaptive interpersonal traits (e.g., narcissism; Wright et al., 2017). However, research is
warranted to better understand the relationship between trait GAD symptoms and daily
interpersonal interaction states, particularly regarding their affective reactions to perceiving
others’ interpersonal behaviors.
Whole Trait Theory Provides a Way to Link Traits and Within-Person States
Whole Trait Theory (WTT; Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Fleeson & Law, 2015)
posits an inseparable link between broad, descriptive traits (e.g., neuroticism) and their
expression in daily situations and states. WTT offers a synthesis of the classic debate about
whether behavior is predominantly a reflection of personality traits or situation-specific factors.
On one side of the debate, people differ from each other in the types of dispositional traits that
broadly describe their behavioral tendencies (e.g., extraversion, agreeableness). On the other side
of the debate, individuals often demonstrate considerable within-person variability in their
behavior across situations in daily life due to variations in external stimuli (i.e., others’
behaviors) and internal processes (e.g., cognitions, affect). However, WTT combines these two
frames by suggesting that a ‘whole trait’ is a compilation of an individual’s daily behavior states
across contexts into a frequency distribution curve, which portrays the pattern of an individual’s
varied, daily behavior as an expression of a single, stable trait of their personality. In this way,
WTT helps researchers account for both within-person variability across situations and trait-like
stability of the distribution of behaviors. Furthermore, WTT posits that the trait explanatory
component causes the state descriptive component of the trait as an output.
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For instance, aggregating an individual’s extraverted states (e.g., cognitions, affects,
behaviors) over time can strongly predict their mean level of extraversion in subsequent periods;
moreover, the standard deviation, skew, and kurtosis of extraversion states within a single person
are similarly stable when aggregated across time, despite large within-person variability from
moment to moment (i.e., the mean and SD of one’s extraverted behaviors in one week is
correlated with the mean and SD in a subsequent week; Fleeson, 2001). Thus, WTT provides a
conceptual and statistical framework for examining trait-like characteristics to predict their
associated daily within-person states. Previous theory and research support this assertion by
suggesting that certain trait-like characteristics or conditions (e.g., borderline personality
disorder) predict stronger within-person links between state-level perceptions and affect (e.g.,
Berenson et al., 2011). Therefore, WTT applied to the current study may be used to investigate
whether GAD symptoms, as a trait-like individual difference variable, amplifies (i.e., moderates)
within-person links between the perception of others’ behaviors and state affective reactions in
daily interpersonal interactions, specifically with behaviors that are conceptualized as
interpersonal threats (i.e., high dominance, coldness, or morally disgusting). The reported
perceptions and reactions may explain a portion of GAD which, according to WTT, we could
assume that GAD is an output of these daily perceptions and reactions. Therefore, collecting
multiple state-level variables (daily perceptions & reactions) can be combined to explain
between-person differences in GAD as a broader trait.
The Interpersonal Circumplex as a Framework for the Interpersonal Domain
Although previous studies have examined threat perceptions broadly in GAD (e.g.,
reactions to “negative” faces; Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999), a conceptual
framework is needed to operationalize interpersonal threats in terms of daily behaviors. The
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Interpersonal Circumplex (IPC; Wiggins, 1982) offers a framework for classifying interpersonal
behaviors that would be expected to vary across daily interactions. It is visualized as a twodimensional circle containing orthogonal axes that broadly represent the dimensions of
dominance and affiliation (Tracey, 1994). The dominance dimension pertains to agency,
assertion, differentiating oneself, autonomy, and strivings for power (Pincus & Hopwood, 2012),
and comprises behaviors that range from dominance to submissive or yielding behavior. The
affiliation dimension represents strivings for unity and intimacy (Pincus & Hopwood, 2012) and
ranges from warm/social/close to cold/distancing behavior. Since these two axes are plotted on a
circle, the IPC can represent each combination of these behaviors around the circumplex
(Gurtman, 2009). For instance, extraverted behavior reflects a blend of high dominance and high
affiliation. Furthermore, research suggests that perceptions of others’ social behavior may also be
mapped onto the dominance and affiliation dimensions, thus supporting the validity of these
fundamental social cognitive dimensions (Moskowitz & Zuroff, 2005), and suggesting the
possibility that perceiving excessive dominance or low affiliation in others might be threatening.
Studies using the interpersonal circumplex show that these two dimensions are relevant to many
types of interpersonal behaviors (Moskowitz, 1994). In addition, correlations of the theorized
behavior characteristics have been shown to adhere to a circular structure, and support the
orthogonality of the dominance and affiliation dimensions (Gurtman, 2009; Gurtman & Pincus,
2000).
Perceived Morality Is a Third Social Cognitive Dimension
Recent theory and research (e.g., Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016) suggests the possible
inclusion of a third social cognitive or interpersonal dimension beyond dominance and
affiliation, and therefore a third potential type of interpersonal threat. This assertion was made
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because some measures of affiliation seem to confound mere social proximity (approaching
others, socializing, or distancing oneself from others) with morally-valenced social behaviors
(e.g., kindness and altruism versus coldhearted actions; Landy et al., 2016). As such, adding
morality as a third dimension to the circumplex may provide additional, vital descriptions of
interpersonal behavior. In fact, perceived morality seems to provide important information about
the intent of another’s social behavior beyond competence (i.e., dominance) and warmth (i.e.,
affiliation; Goodwin, 2015). Similarly, behavior that is helpful and cooperative toward others is
generally considered morally good (Curry, Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019), and therefore humans
may be inherently attentive to whether others’ interpersonal behavior adheres, or conflicts, with
such social mores. In contrast, perceiving a person engaging in behavior that is low in morality
may present a social risk in that it may be unsafe to try cooperate with a person prone to such
behaviors (e.g., lying, cheating, stealing; Miles, Griffiths, Richardson, & Macrae, 2010; Van ‘t
Wout & Sanfey, 2008) and they too may be less likely to reciprocate cooperation (Curry et al.,
2019).
One way to detect the presence of morally valenced behavior within interpersonal
interactions would be to assess the extent to which behaviors elicit moral elevation versus sociomoral disgust (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Haidt, 2003; Haidt, 2006). Moral elevation
(Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Beck, 2006) occurs in response to perceiving uncommon acts of moral
goodness. The experience of moral elevation has been described as feeling subjectively uplifted,
and appears to involve somatic sensations such as being moved to tears or feeling a lump in the
throat (Algoe & Haidt, 2009), increased cognitions about the goodness of humanity (Erickson &
Abelson, 2012), and increased motivation to become a better person (Algoe & Haidt, 2009;
Aquino, McFerran, & Laven, 2011; Van de Vyver & Abrams, 2017). Feeling elevated is a
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marker for perceiving others’ behavior as morally desirable. In contrast, socio-moral disgust may
index the low end of the perceived moral dimension. Socio-moral disgust is related to core
disgust (i.e., elicited by thoughts of ingesting physical contaminants) but is thought to occur in
response to acts perceived as morally impure or contaminating (Olantunji & Sawchuk, 2005;
Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011). In both core- and sociomoral disgust, the reaction is to establish
a psychological, and in some cases a physical, boundary to ward off the “contaminant”
(Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012), and in this way socio-moral disgust may function like a
reaction to an interpersonal threat.
To date there is minimal research on the proposed moral dimension to support its
existence within the interpersonal domain. Most of the investigation of elevation and socio-moral
disgust have involved prototypical exemplars that elicit the emotion, such as learning the story of
someone who “saved [another person’s] from a life of gang activity and violence” (Silvers &
Haidt, 2008, p. 292) versus committing fraud or theft (Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009),
respectively. However, no known research has examined perceptions of morally elevating versus
morally disgusting interpersonal behaviors in daily life.
The research that has been done strongly supported that perceived trait morality is unique
from trait dominance and affiliation. Across a combined total of 13 studies, Landy and
colleagues (2016) and Goodwin and colleagues (2014) sought to understand the differential
influence of perceived morality compared to sociability (i.e., affiliation) and competence (i.e.,
dominance) on impressions of other people. Trait adjectives that varied in morality, sociability,
and competence were developed (Goodwin et al., 2014, Studies 1 & 2) and subsequently used as
descriptions of people and roles in hypothetical vignettes. In addition, in some of the studies,
participants rated their preferences for high- versus low-morality traits in combination with only

16

sociable (i.e., affiliation; Goodwin et al., 2014, Studies 4 -7) or both sociable and competence
traits (Goodwin et al., 2014, Studies 2 & 3; Landy et a., 2016, Studies 1-6). The results
consistently showed that moral traits were 1) preferred to sociable and competence traits and 2)
the most influential of the three groups of traits on forming positive (or negative in the case of
immoral traits) impressions of others. However, the studies were limited in that they were crosssectional and focused on the participants’ global appraisals (e.g., like or dislike) of morality in
abstract trait descriptions or written vignettes.
To expand upon this research, subsequent studies should investigate how participants
perceive daily, naturalistic behaviors that vary in dominance, affiliation, and morality, and
whether these dimensions have a differential effect on the perceiver’s self-reported affective
reactions. Examining the affective reaction would add additional context to the perceived
behavior and speak to the possible function of the behavior; for instance, whether a given
interpersonal behavior (e.g., dominant, cold, immoral) was perceived as threatening, as
suggested by a combination of high arousal and low valence.
Empirical Evidence Implies Moral Components of GAD
Interpersonal research on GAD has thus far only utilized the two dimensions of
dominance and affiliation. For instance, high worry and/or GAD symptoms have been linked to
either 1) self-reported interpersonal problems comprised of blends of dominance and affiliation
(Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008) or 2) specifically affiliative processes (e.g., being
overly nurturant; e.g., Erickson et al., 2016; Shin & Newman, 2019; Zainal & Newman, 2017).
However, a few studies suggest reasons to suspect that individuals high in GAD symptoms may
be attentive to issues of morality.
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For instance, a factor analysis of 20 different types of worries – several of which were a
priori defined as worries about one’s morality (e.g., “I worry that I have sometimes been
dishonest in my work,” “I worry that I have made bad choices when faced with moral conflicts,”
“I worry that people will find out what I really am like”) – showed that moral concerns, versus
practical or self-image concerns, emerged as the largest factor, thus suggesting that one’s
morality was a predominant foci of worry (Kroll et al., 2002). In addition, Erickson and
colleagues (2016) found that higher trait worry uniquely predicted higher self-reported
compassionate motivations to help others, despite the fact that worriers’ significant others did not
view them similarly. Worriers may thus perceive their worrying as a moral action. Regarding the
present study, engaging in frequent moral actions may make a person more sensitive to
perceiving threats to their morality. Additional evidence by Hebert and colleagues’ (2014)
indicates that worriers tend to endorse the metacognitive belief “I worry because I care,”
implying that they may view worry as a way to deal with perceived moral shortcomings,
injustices, or imperfections in the world. Other research has shown increased cognitive empathy
(i.e., attention to social information) in individuals with GAD symptoms when induced to worry
(Zainal & Newman, 2017), which may indicate a moral component to worry in terms of
prosocial cognitions. Finally, in another study, Erickson and Abelson (2012) examined the link
between daily moral elevation and anxiety symptoms. They found that days in which participants
(a mixed clinical sample including some participants with GAD) reported higher moral
elevation, relative to their own means, they also endorsed fewer anxiety and dysphoria
symptoms. However, the authors did not examine social perceptions occurring within the context
of specific social interactions and did not specifically examine morality apart from the affiliation
dimension.
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The theory of Morality as Cooperation (Curry, Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019) posits that
behaviors regarding helping group members helping family members, and reciprocating
cooperation with others. Perhaps individuals with high trait worry are more sensitive to these
types of behaviors or feel more afraid of their not being the subject of others’ cooperation.
Furthermore, perhaps these findings suggest that individuals with GAD symptoms may hold
concerns about their cooperating with others and/or whether others will cooperate with them.
Nevertheless, we might expect individuals with high trait GAD symptoms to be particularly
sensitive to interpersonal threats that are low in morality.
There is Limited Evidence About How People with GAD Perceive Others’ Behaviors
What studies have been done show that people with GAD seem to have a bias toward
perceiving others as dominant, cold (i.e. unaffiliative), and cold-dominant (Newman & Erickson,
2010; Erickson & Pincus, 2005). This pattern remained even after controlling for depression and
social anxiety symptoms (Newman & Erickson, 2010). Furthermore, during first impressions in a
social interaction task with a friendly stranger, the participants with GAD symptoms were
relatively more like to perceive experimental confederates as attacking, ignoring, and controlling
(Erickson & Pincus, 2005). While these results offer little context to help give meaning to the
perceptions, we might assume that because of the propensity of individuals with GAD symptoms
to attend to threats, the perceived behavior may have functioned as perceived threats. Therefore,
we might expect people with high trait GAD symptoms to report more perceptions of dominant
and cold behavior across daily interactions. Moreover, given the tendency of “immoral”
behaviors to be perceived as aversive (Chapman & Anderson, 2013; Pizarro et al., 2011), we
might also expect individuals with high trait GAD symptoms to report more perceptions of
others’ behavior as disgusting or immoral.
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Interpersonal Behaviors as Perceived Threats
While the IPC offers a broad framework for understanding interpersonal behaviors,
researchers must conceptualize IPC behaviors in ways that give meaning to the behaviors in
relation to the trait variable being investigated. Given that GAD is associated with sensitivity to
perceiving threats, we can conceptualize specific IPC behaviors in terms of their potential to
function as interpersonal threats. Although virtually any behavior can be perceived as threatening
based on how it is interpreted, some behaviors have been more consistently linked to
interpersonal threat than others. For instance, interpersonal threats include behaviors that may be
associated with detrimental social ramifications such as negative evaluation (Knowles, Lucas,
Molden, Gardner, & Dean, 2010), verbal punishment (Hebl, King, Glick, Singletary, & Kazama,
2007), rejection (Kross, Egner, Ochsner, Hirsch, & Downey, 2007), abandonment (Eng,
Heimberg, Hart, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2001), being exploited (Glick & Fiske, 1996), or
damage to one’s reputation from being associated with others’ immoral behavior (Sacheva, Iliev,
& Medin, 2009; Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). These behaviors can be interpreted as
threatening to the extent that they block the psychological needs (Knowles et al., 2010) of
autonomy, competence, and belonging, all of which would otherwise facilitate psychological
adjustment and well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Given that behavior can be interpreted in virtually any way, it is important to emphasize
how specific behaviors may be interpreted with respect to a trait of interest (e.g., GAD
symptoms). Since GAD is associated with heightened sensitivity to perceived threats, what
follows is a conceptualization of IPC behaviors on the three dimensions as interpersonal threats.
Each conceptualization is supported with a purported psychological need that is likely to be
threatened.
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First, another person’s dominant behavior may threaten one’s need for competence or
autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Second, cold behavior may threaten one’s need for
relatedness/belongingness (Ryan & Deci, 2000). In contrast, warm behavior may be perceived as
safe and reassuring, submissive behavior may appear compliant and overtly non-threatening
(Newman et al., 2013). Third, although morally elevating behavior may be perceived as
trustworthy and signal good moral character (Keltner, Kogan, Piff, & Saturn, 2014), perceived
immoral social behavior may signal low trustworthiness (Van ‘t Wout & Sanfey, 2008) and low
cooperation (Curry et al., 2019), and threaten one’s need for moral self-worth (Sacheva, Iliev, &
Medin, 2009) as well as the need to avoid being “contaminated” by another person’s impure
behavior (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Tang et al., 2017; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).
Furthermore, perceiving others’ moral behavior may be threatening if it evokes an upward social
comparison, sparks fears of being judged as morally inferior, or stirs uncertainty about one’s own
morality (Monin, 2007).
Affective Responses May Suggest Perceived Threats
The affective response to a perceived behavior is a key component that implies whether a
behavior was considered threatening. For instance, fear, anxiety, and shame are three negative
emotions that have been shown to arise in response to perceived threats (e.g., Arnaudova et al.,
2017; Leech, Barnes-Holmes, Madden, 2016). When broken into their constituent components,
fear, anxiety, and shame consist of negative affect (i.e., unpleasantness) and heightened
physiological arousal (Carver & White, 1994; Jefferies, Smilek, Eich, & Enns, 2008), whereas
other types of negative emotions, such as sadness, would include negative affect and decreased
physiological arousal (Jefferies, Smilek, Eich, & Enns, 2008). In contrast, emotion that is
positively-valenced (i.e., pleasant) and arousing suggests the experience of positive emotion
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(e.g., joy, excitement), which is more likely to evoke approach behaviors (Carver & White,
1994). Therefore, determining whether a stimulus was perceived as threatening depends upon the
emotion it evokes. For instance, one person’s increase in arousal and negative affect in response
to another person’s cold behavior suggests the behavior was perceived as threatening, whereas a
different person’s positive emotion evoked by the same behavior implies it was perceived as
rewarding. Although we would expect most people to react with negative affect and arousal to
interpersonal behaviors that are perceived as dominant, cold, and immoral, GAD symptoms
likely moderate these relationships in that having higher levels of GAD symptoms may
prospectively predict higher self-reported affective reactions to perceived interpersonal threats.
The Present Study
Therefore, the present study sought to examine participants’ baseline trait levels of selfreported GAD symptoms in relation to their daily perceptions of others’ behaviors and affective
responses to the behaviors. Broadly, I expect perceptions of dominant, cold (low affiliation), and
immoral or disgusting interpersonal behaviors to predict greater negative affect and arousal,
thereby functioning as interpersonal threats across all the participants, but that GAD symptoms
will moderate these relationships by strengthening them.
Hypotheses
First (GAD main effects), I hypothesized that baseline trait GAD symptoms will
prospectively predict higher daily perceptions of others’ dominant behavior (Hypothesis [H] 1a),
cold behavior (H1b), and immoral behavior (H1c) as well as high self-reported arousal (H2a) and
lower valence (H2b). Given that GAD is associated with increased sensitivity to threats, and the
literature suggests that perceived threats are more likely to occur with dominant, cold, and
immoral behaviors (for people in general), I predicted that individuals with higher GAD
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symptoms would report more instances of these behaviors as opposed to the presumably lessthreatening behaviors (warmth, submission, moral behavior). Furthermore, given that GAD
involves physiological arousal symptoms and that worry involves the experience of negative
affect (i.e., fear, anxiety), I predicted increased reported GAD symptoms to be related to
increased reports of arousal and lower valence.
Second (social perception main effects), I hypothesize between-person effects, such that
higher mean levels of perceived dominant behavior, cold behavior, and immoral behavior across
daily interactions will each predict higher self-reported arousal (H3a, H4a, & H5a, respectively)
and lower valence (H3b, H4b, & H5b, respectively). Individuals who are chronically exposed to
perceived interpersonal threats may experience higher levels of affective arousal and lower
valence compared to participants with less exposure to interpersonal threats. Next, I hypothesize
that within-person increases in perceived dominant behavior, cold behavior, and immoral
behavior in daily interactions will each predict higher self-reported arousal (H3c, H4c, & H5c,
respectively) and lower valence (H3d, H4d, & H5d, respectively). That is, after accounting for
each participant’s mean level of perceptions of others, when participants perceive increases in
dominant, cold, or immoral behavior, they would report higher arousal and lower valence
relative to their own mean. This is because dominant, cold, and immoral behavior are more likely
to be perceived of as threatening across the participants, as they may threaten the needs for
autonomy, belongingness, and avoiding contamination, respectively.
Third (GAD symptom moderation effects). I hypothesize that trait GAD symptoms will
moderate (strengthen) the relationships between daily mean perceived dominant behavior, cold
behavior, and immoral behavior and self-reported arousal (H6a, H7a, & H8a, respectively) and
valence (H6b, H7b, & H8b, respectively). In other words, individual high in GAD symptoms
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would show stronger chronic affective responses to perceived dominant, cold, and immoral
behavior across the daily interactions. Furthermore, I hypothesize that trait GAD symptoms will
moderate (strengthen) the within-person relationships between perceived dominant behavior,
cold behavior, and immoral behavior and self-reported arousal (H6c, H7c, & H8c, respectively)
and valence (H6d, H7d, & H8d, respectively). Although I predicted that dominant, cold, and
immoral behaviors will be perceived of as threatening to people in general, individuals with
more severe GAD symptoms were likely to find these interpersonal behaviors more threatening.
Figures 1-3 depict the hypothesized theoretical models of direct and moderating effects between
the variables.
Figure 1
Daily perceived dominant behavior predicting arousal and valence, moderated by baseline GAD
symptoms.
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Figure 2
Daily perceived cold behavior predicting arousal and valence, moderated by baseline GAD
symptoms.

Figure 3
Daily perceived immoral behavior predicting arousal and valence, moderated by baseline GAD
symptoms.

25

CHAPTER II
Method
Recruitment
To examine test these hypotheses, undergraduates were recruited from psychology
courses at a private university in the Pacific Northwest between Fall 2017 and Summer 2018.
They were offered course credit in exchange for their participation, whereas individuals who
declined to participate were instead given the option to write an essay for course credit. A total of
182 Participants completed baseline measures, however 18 did not complete any daily diary
surveys, one participant completed only one survey, and one participant was identified as using a
response set. Therefore, 21 participants were deleted from the analyses, resulting in a final
sample of 161 participants aged 18 to 25 years (82.6% female, 1.2% gender non-binary). The
participants self-identified as White (55.3%), Black (2.5%), Latinx (9.3%), Multiracial (14.3%),
Asian (15.5%), Middle Eastern (1.9%), Samoan/Pacific Islander (0.6%), and one participant did
not disclose their race or ethnicity (0.6%).
Procedure
Following recruitment, participants were sent an Internet link to a Qualtrics survey that
contained the baseline self-report measures regarding their demographics and GAD symptoms.
Several other measures were completed at baseline as a part of a larger study about interpersonal
behavior, personality, cognition, and emotion. However, only the measures used in the present
study are discussed further. After completing the baseline measures, participants were sent 30
experience sampling surveys over the subsequent 10 days (3 surveys per day) via text or email,
based on each participant’s preference. Odd-numbered waves were sent at 11am, 3pm, and 8pm
and even-numbered waves were sent at 10 am, 2 pm, and 5 pm each day.
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To minimize participant adoption of response sets, in which they respond to a
questionnaire the same way each time, the research team created two versions of the daily survey
and randomized the order that participants were sent each version across the 30 surveys. To
maximize participant engagement and minimize attrition as participants completed the daily
surveys, I emailed participants once or twice during the daily diary protocol with a pre-written
and pre-approved standardized message to inform participants 1) of how many surveys had been
completed to that point, 2) to finish any uncompleted surveys, and 3) offer encouragement for
having completed surveys. For the participants whose surveys had timed out or the links were
lost or broken, I sent additional anonymized Qualtrics survey links (randomized survey version 1
or 2) until the participants completed 30 surveys or stopped responding. Participants were
awarded their extra credit shortly after completing the 10 days of experience sampling,
regardless of the number of daily surveys they completed.
Measures
Baseline Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms - Generalized Anxiety Disorder
Questionnaire for DSM-IV (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002)
The GAD-Q-IV is a widely-used nine-item self-report measure of dimensional worry
symptoms over the preceding six months (Newman et al., 2002). It was developed to serve as a
brief screening instrument for the DSM-IV version of GAD. Given that the DSM-5 GAD criteria
are nearly identical to those from the DSM-IV, the GAD-Q-IV can still be used to screen for the
DSM-5 version of GAD (Pierson, Prenoveau, Craske, Netsi, & Stein, 2017). The GAD-Q-IV
includes five yes/no items, two 8-point Likert-type scales (0 = none, 8 = very severe), one
checklist of symptoms, and a free-response asking the respondent to list his or her specific topics
of excessive and uncontrollable worry. Each of the free-responses earns 1/3 point, thus allowing

27

a maximum of two points if the respondent includes six distinct topics about which they worry.
Additionally, answering “no” to having experienced worry consistently over the preceding six
months allows respondents to skip the second half of the assessment. However, the participants’
responses to the second half can be retained when using the instrument to assess dimensional
GAD symptoms (M. Newman, personal communication, December 11, 2019). All the answers
can be computed into a total scale score, with higher scores representing higher presence of selfreported GAD symptoms. Newman and colleagues established a cut score of 5.7 to classify
scores that indicate probable GAD diagnosis. However, subsequent research increased the cut
score to 7.67 to better balance sensitivity and specificity (Moore, Anderson, Barnes, Haigh, &
Fresco, 2014).
The GAD-Q-IV has been used in investigations of interventions for GAD (Jonsson &
Kjellgren, 2015), as an outcome measure for GAD treatment (Dahlin et al., 2016), to examine
cognitive processes underlying GAD (Goodwin, Eagleson, Mathews, Yiend, & Hirsch, 2017),
and in the investigation of factors that maintain worry (Llera & Newman, 2014). Concurrent
validity with GAD diagnoses obtained through structured clinical interview, the Anxiety
Disorder Interview Schedule for the DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994)
was Kappa = .67, wherein the GAD-Q-IV accurately classified 88% of the participants and had a
false positive rate of 11% (Newman et al., 2002). Concurrent validity between the GAD-Q-IV
and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al., 1990) ranged from r = .55 (Newman et
al., 2002) to r = .75 (Toh et al., 2017).
Discriminant validity was tested in a sample of 391 undergraduate students (Newman et
al., 2002). The GAD-Q-IV was found to discriminate between PTSD symptoms (r = .45), Social
Anxiety Disorder symptoms (r = .34), panic disorder symptoms (r = .30), depression (r = .26)
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and fear of relaxation (r = .58). However, no significant differences have been found for GADQ-IV scores between individuals with GAD and those with comorbid GAD and Major
Depressive Disorder (Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & Gotlib, 2015).
Test-retest reliability between the GAD-Q-IV taken at two weeks apart was kappa = .64,
with 92% of individuals retaining their GAD diagnosis over the two weeks (Newman et al.,
2002). Reported internal consistency has ranged from .75 (Ruggiero et al., 2017) to .82
(Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquín, 2008). Internal consistency for the present sample was good (α
= .81).
Baseline Depression Symptoms – The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale
(CES-D Scale; Radloff, 1977)
The CES-D is a 20-item self-report measure of depression symptoms over the past week.
The depression symptoms fall into a 4-factor structure of depressed affect, positive affect
(reverse-scored), somatic symptoms and psychomotor retardation, and interpersonal difficulties,
but given correlated factors, all items are combined into a composite score. Respondents rate
each item on a four-point Likert scale to indicate the duration they experienced each symptom (0
= Rarely or None of the Time [Less than 1 day]; 1 = Some or a Little of the Time [1-2 days]; 2 =
Occasionally or a Moderate Amount of Time [3-4 days]; 3 = Most or All of the Time [5-7 days]).
The items are summed for a possible total scale score ranging from zero to 60, and higher scores
indicate more severe depression symptoms. Radloff (1977) identified an initial cutoff score of 16
as suggesting clinically significant depression. However, a recent meta-analysis of 28 studies
using the CES-D indicated that a cutoff score of 20 provided a better balance of sensitivity and
specificity (Vilagut, Forero, Barbaglia, & Alonso, 2016). It has been effectively used in diverse
ethnic populations such as American, Canadian (Carleton et al., 2013), Korean (Moon et al.,
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2017), and French (Moullec et al., 2010). It has shown good convergent validity with the PHQ-9
(Milette, Hudson, Baron, & Thombs, 2010) and the trait anxiety subscale of the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Orme, Reis, & Herz, 1986). Furthermore, it has shown discriminant
validity with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the state subscale of the STAI (Orme, Reis, &
Herz, 1986). However, women have been found to report higher scores on the CES-D compared
to men (Carleton et al., 2013). Internal consistency has ranged from good (α = .85) to excellent
(α = .94) across undergraduate, rehabilitation, clinical, a Canadian community sample, and
United States nation-wide survey samples (Carleton et al., 2013). Internal consistency for the
present sample was acceptable (α = .78).
Daily Perceptions of Others’ Behavior in Naturalistic Interactions
Each of the surveys asked participants to retrospectively report on their most recent
interpersonal interaction that lasted at least 5 minutes. Participants reported the other person's
initials, gender, and role (e.g., romantic partner, acquaintance, authority figure) and then briefly
described the person's behavior. However, these variables were not examined in the present
study. Then the surveys prompted participants to rate their perception of the other person’s
behavior along the dimensions of dominance, affiliation, and morality (e.g., “How dominant was
the other person’s behavior?”) with three 5-point Likert-type scales (i.e., not at all, a little,
moderately, a lot, extremely), and with multiple anchors for each dimension. Each IPC
dimension was assessed with single items to permit a comparison of quantified ratings of
perceived behavior and to minimize the participant’s burden of responding to repeated items
across 30 surveys. Furthermore, each participant was expected to perceive varying levels of
dominant, cold, and immoral behaviors differently across interpersonal interactions and
compared to other participants. Indeed, previous research with single-item ratings in experience
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sampling has shown that perceptions of others’ behaviors often vary both between- and withinperson (e.g., Scott et al., 2017). The Spearman-Brown coefficient for the split-half reliabilities
for each dimension were acceptable (dominance = .78, affiliation = .78, and morality = .78).
Daily Affective Response - Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989)
The affect grid is a two-dimensional plane comprised of two orthogonal dimensions of
emotional arousal and valence (Figure 4). Arousal ranges from sleepiness to high arousal and
valence ranges from positive, pleasant feelings to negative, unpleasant feelings. This measure
allows easy single-item repeated assessment of emotion without unduly burdening participants in
repeated measures designs (Russell et al., 1989). In the present study, participants were prompted
to, “Please click once on the emotion grid to rate HOW YOU FELT during the interaction.”
Participants then selected a point on a displayed 96 x 95 grid that best characterized their affect.
The grid was overlaid with an image of Russell and colleagues’ 9 x 9 affect grid. Around the grid
were text with affective anchors including, Excitement, Sleepiness, High Arousal, Unpleasant
Feelings, etc., that varied according to the two underlying dimensions. Each participant’s
selection was coded by Qualtrics as x and y coordinates, where the x-axis indicated the level of
affective valence and the y-axis indicated the level of affective arousal. Other studies have been
found that used a similarly fine-grained affect grid for repeated measures assessments (Kuppens,
Champagne, Tuerlinckx, 2012).
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Figure 4
Affect grid from Russell et al., 1989.

The affect grid’s psychometric properties have been shown to be adequate. Evidence of
the orthogonal relationship between the valence and arousal dimensions support the affect grid’s
construct validity and discriminant validity for the valence and arousal dimensions (Killgore,
1998; Russell et al., 1989). Estimates of convergent validity have included moderate to strong
correlations between the valence dimension with the Beck Depression Inventory, the Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and the Profile of
Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1992). The arousal dimension showed small
to moderate correlations with the positive affect PANAS items and the Vigor and Fatigue items
of the POMS (Killgore, 1998). The affect grid’s low overlap of correlations with the different
measures further support its discriminant validity.
Because the affect grid is a single-item measure of affect, traditional estimates of
reliability and internal consistency are less applicable compared to measures with multiple items
(Tiede, 2019). However, Russell and colleagues (1989) calculated split-half reliability across two
studies by having participants rate emotion words or pictures of faces. Although the samples
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were small (ns = 20 and 25), the split half reliabilities for the valence dimension were .98 and
.99, respectively, and for the arousal dimension was .97 across both studies. In a recent study,
Tiede (2019) had 19 participants completed an average of 28 affect grid ratings across a week of
experience sampling. The author found within-person split-half reliability of r = .80 (valence)
and r = .73 (arousal). For the present study, the Spearman Brown coefficient for the affect grid’s
split-half reliability was acceptable for the arousal dimension (r = .74) and for the valence
dimension (r = .75).
Data Analytic Plan
Power Considerations
A post-hoc power analysis is desired, given that the current study utilized an archival
dataset. The present study aimed to detect cross-level interactions, such as the relationship
between Level 1 predictors (i.e., perceptions of behavior) that may differ as a function of the
Level 2 variable (i.e., GAD symptom severity; Mathieu, Aguinis, Culpepper, & Chen, 2012, p.
951). Calculating power in Multilevel Modeling (MLM) differs from typical procedures in
regression analyses. For instance, the power to detect cross-level interactions in MLM has been
shown to depend largely on the cross-level interaction (i.e., effect), sample sizes of the Level 1
and Level 2 variables, standard deviation (SD) of the Level 1 regression coefficients (Mathieu et
al., 2012), the level of power, as well as the sizes of the variance components and the covariance
of the random slope and random intercept (Arend & Schäfer, 2019), and the Intraclass
Correlation Coefficient (ICC; McCoach, 2010). Moreover, determining power also depends on
the selected Alpha (i.e., risk of Type I error), which for the present study is α = .05. In a
repeated-measures design, the sample size is considered for both the Level 2 variable (i.e.,
number of participants) and Level 1 variable (i.e., surveys completed by each participant over
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time). Power is maximized when both the Level 1 and Level 2 samples are sufficiently large,
which has been suggested to be ≥ 18 and ≥ 115, respectively (Mathieu et al., 2012). The Level 1
and Level 2 samples sizes for the present study exceed these recommendations.
Beyond the determination of whether a study has adequate statistical power, it is
becoming increasingly recommended that researchers identify the effect size(s) that a given
study is powered to detect. Recently, Arend and Schäfer (2019) provided estimates (based on
their review of research and a Monte Carlo simulation) for the minimal detectable effect size
(MDES) for MLM designs. Their estimates are based on standardized effects with standardized
predictors and outcome variables, so the effect sizes are comparable across measures and studies.
The authors asserted that power must be determined separately for each desired effect (i.e., L1 &
L2 main effects, cross-level interaction). The authors indicate that, with a power level of .80 and
a Level 2 sample size of 150 and Level 1 sample size of 25, there would be sufficient power to
detect at least a .09 direct effect for the Level 1 variable, regardless of the size of the ICC. Using
the same parameter estimates, assuming power of at least .80, an ICC of .10 would permit
detecting a level 2 direct effect of at least .27 (standardized), an ICC of .30 would be sufficient to
detect an effect of .24, and an ICC of .50 would permit the detection of at least a .23 effect.
Finally, the MDESs for the cross-level interaction with the same input parameters depends on the
size of the random slope variance component (RS). An RS of .01 would permit detecting effects
of at least .51, an RS of .09 would detect a .28 effect, and an RS of .25 would detect a .25 effect.
Thus, assuming small ICCs (~.10) for the L1 variables and small RS’s (~.01) in the present
sample, I should have enough statistical power to detect at least a .09 level 1 direct effect, a .27
level 2 direct effect, and a .51 cross-level interaction.
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Data Preparation
Each participant’s depression symptoms (CES-D) sum score was calculated, after
reverse-coding the appropriate items, and GAD-Q-IV responses were summed according to
Newman and colleagues’ (2002) procedure to obtain a total score. Then all the L1 variables were
first centered at zero so that positive values reflected high arousal, positive valence, and
perceived dominance, coldness, and immorality; negative values represented low arousal,
negative valence, and perceived submission, affiliation, and morality, respectively; and scores of
zero reflected neutrality. This facilitated obtaining descriptive statistics for each variable. Then
all the L2 study variables were grand-mean centered to control for the central tendencies in
responding among all the participants in this sample. Separate person-mean centered variables
were created for each L1 variable by subtracting each participant’s scores by their own means on
each variable. This facilitated the examination of within-person effects by controlling for each
participant’s mean. Finally, standardized versions of the variables (except the covariate gender),
both between- and within-persons, were also calculated to facilitate identification of MDESs.
Preliminary Analyses
First, I conducted data pre-screening. Participants who completed fewer than 3 surveys
were deleted. In addition, one participant’s data was deleted due to their data showing no
variability (only the maximum ratings of 2s) on both the affiliation and morality dimensions
across all their surveys, therefore suggesting that the participant used a response set. One
participant mistakenly completed the entire daily diary protocol twice, resulting in a total of 62
completed surveys. I examined the results with and without this participant’s data and there were
no markedly different results. Therefore, to increase variability and power, all of this
participant’s surveys were retained in the analyses. The final sample consisted of 161
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participants who completed a total of 4,533 surveys. The participants completed an average of
28.16 out of 30 surveys, indicating a 93.9% compliance rate. The data were assessed for the
degree of missingness. There was no missing data for the baseline measure (GAD-Q-IV), and
only 5 cells in the daily diaries showed missing data. Therefore, missing data were not imputed
because the effect is negligible with less than 5% missingness (Cheema 2014; Schafer, 1999).
Next, all variables and residuals were inspected for normality (e.g., skew, kurtosis). This
was done by plotting histogram plots of all study variables as well as the residuals for all
variables. Because there were a large number of surveys completed, traditional tests of normality
(e.g., Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk) were not appropriate due to an inflated risk for Type
I error (Field, 2013). Instead, I used visual inspection of the histogram plots and descriptive
statistics to understand examine degree of skew and kurtosis. In the present study, all the
variables fell within -.770 to .361 skew and -.794 to .165 kurtosis, thus indicating normal skew
and kurtosis (Field, 2013). In addition, visual inspection of the histograms suggested that all the
variables were normally distributed.
Analytical Strategy
I first obtained descriptive statistics for each variable, though it should be noted that the
L1 variables include multiple entries for each participant. Consequently, the L1 descriptive
statistics reflect the grand mean of all completed surveys. Then I calculated each participant’s
mean for each L1 variable and conducted a Pearson’s bivariate correlation between GAD-Q-IV
score, CES-D score, and participant means for all the L1 variables. To analyze the effects of
gender, I created two separate dummy coded variables. The first variable was coded to compare
the effects of female, coded as 1, to non-female participants (i.e., male, gender non-binary),
coded as 0. The second variable compared the two gender non-binary participants, coded as 1, to
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the remaining cis-gendered participants, coded as 0. Both dummy coded variables were included
simultaneously in each analysis. All but one of the analyses showed non-significant effects based
on gender identity (see Table 1 note). Otherwise, there were negligible differences in the effects
if gender identity was included or excluded. Therefore, the gender identity variables were
dropped from the analyses to maximize statistical power, and the effects of gender identity will
not be discussed further.
Data were analyzed using multilevel modeling (MLM) via the SPSS 26 MIXED
command. MLMs are appropriate to account for the nesting of repeated measures (e.g., multiple
daily interactions; Level 1) within higher-order units (participants; Level 2). In addition, using
MLMs for the present analyses is advantageous because they can handle unbalanced data
(participants completing different numbers of surveys), model between- and within-person
variability, permit random effects and cross-level interactions, and allow researchers to specify
the type of covariance between repeated L1 variables. For the present analyses, individual
participants were specified as the L2 groups and daily diaries were specified as L1 repeated
measures variables. GAD symptoms and depression symptoms were modeled at Level 2 and all
the remaining variables were modeled at Level 1. An AR1 (autoregressive) covariance structure
was assumed to be most appropriate covariance structure for the data, as it assumes surveys
completed close in time are more highly correlated than surveys completed at more distal times.
However, alternate covariance structures were also tested for optimal fit. Finally, Maximum
Likelihood (ML) estimation was used, which is generally recommended for large datasets to
yield more accurate parameter estimates (Field, 2013).
Nine separate MLMs were conducted to test all the hypotheses. These were conducted
first with unstandardized predictors and outcome variables and then with standardized predictors
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and outcome variables (for comparison with MDESs). First, I conducted five MLMs to examine
the fixed effects of GAD symptoms predicting each of the five L1 variables. Gender and
depression symptoms were modeled as covariates. Both GAD symptoms and depression
symptoms were grand-mean centered and the outcome variables were in their raw format. This
procedure permitted the detection of between-person differences of L1 variables at different
levels of the L2 variables.
Next, I conducted two MLMs to examine the fixed and random effects of perceived
dominance, affiliation, and morality on arousal and valence. These predictors were each
designated as Block 1 in a model-building approach. The L1 predictors included both personmeans and person-mean centered variables to examine the between- and within-person effects,
respectively. These two MLMs allowed me to examine the unique effects of each social
perception dimension while simultaneously controlling for the other dimensions and the L2
variables. Furthermore, modeling random effects permitted the examination of significant
between-person variability for each of the L1 variables. Because GAD symptoms is a L2
variable with a single data point for each participant, its random effects were not modeled.
Again, the L2 variables were included as covariates. For these two analyses, as well as the
subsequent analyses, GAD symptoms and depression symptoms were grand-mean centered.
Finally, using a model-building approach, I conducted two more MLMs by adding the six
interaction variables to each of the previous models in Block 2. This was done to examine how
GAD interacted with the mean social perceptions and person-centered variables in predicting
arousal and valence. Significant interactions were followed up with simple slopes analyses
(Dawson, 2014). Figures 1-3 show theoretical models of the moderation analyses.
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The AIC was noted to identify the best-fitting model with the optimal level of complexity
while matching appropriate statistical assumptions. AIC is a transformation of the -2 Log
Likelihood that is adjusted for the number of predictors in the model (Field, 2013). Although the
AIC has no inherent meaning by itself, a lower AIC indicates better model fit relative to other
models with the same dependent variable but different predictors and/or effects. Therefore, I
compared the AIC of the saturated model to the AIC of previous models.
In addition, I used the AIC to compare the optimal fit of different covariance structures
for the repeated-measures, L1 variables. An autoregressive (AR1) covariance structure emerged
as the best fit for the L1 variables, as other covariance structures (e.g., Compound Symmetry,
Variance Components, Unstructured, AR1-Heterogeneous) either failed to converge or resulted
in a higher AIC. AR1 assumes that surveys completed nearest in time to one another correlate
more highly than surveys completed at more distal times.
CHAPTER III
Results
Sample Characteristics, Frequencies, and Bivariate Correlations
The sample characteristics indicated that, on average, the participants reported
themselves as experiencing moderate levels of GAD symptoms. The mean for the sample
surpasses the initial cut score (5.7; Newman et al., 2002) but not an updated cut score (7.67;
Moore, Anderson, Barnes, Haigh, & Fresco, 2014) that indicates probable GAD diagnosis. This
suggests the present sample has somewhat elevated GAD symptoms. Additionally, the sample’s
mean CES-D score is equal to the revised cut score (≥ 20) that suggests mild depression (Vilagut
et al., 2016). Across means of the L1 variables, the participants showed a tendency toward
perceiving others as slightly dominant, affiliative, and moral. In addition, the participants tended
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to report experiencing slightly high valence and slightly low arousal (i.e., slightly calm). The
average reporting of high valence is consistent with trends seen in previous repeated-measures
studies, whereas participants in other studies tended to report themselves as experiencing a mild
degree of affective arousal (e.g., Cain, Meehan, Roche, Clarkin, & De Panfilis, 2019; Smyth,
Zawadzki, Juth, Sciamanna, 2017). Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and
bivariate correlations for each study variable. To better understand trait-level tendencies for each
participant across all the surveys, I obtained the range, minimum, and maximum of all
participant means for each L1. Next, frequencies of ratings on each dimension were obtained.
The frequencies showed that within each dimension, independent of the other two dimensions,
participants reported the most instances of neutral dominance, high affiliation, and high moral
interpersonal behaviors (Table 2). Participants reported perceiving the least number of instances
of low dominance (submission), low affiliative (cold), and immoral behaviors. Therefore, these
sample characteristics support the decision to person-center the L1 predictors as well as outcome
variables to control for each participant’s average ratings on each variable.
Bivariate Pearson’s correlations were conducted between participants’ means on all L1
variables, GAD-Q-IV score, and CES-D score (Table 1). Intraclass Correlation Coefficients
(ICC) were calculated for each variable to identify the amount of within-person variability
present for each L1 variable. The ICCs were small and ranged from .12 to .17, which indicated
that 12% to 17% of the variance was between-person and 88% to 83% of the variability was
within-person, respectively. These patterns of variability are consistent with prior studies that
utilized perceptions of others’ interpersonal behavior (e.g., Sadikaj et al., 2013). Consequently,
the greater within-person variability in the present study justified conducting MLM to examine
such variability.
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Direct Effects of GAD Symptoms on Arousal, Valence, and Perceptions of Others’
Dominant, Cold, and Immoral Behavior
Hypotheses 1a-c and 2a-b pertained to the between-person fixed effect of GAD symptom
level on each of the L1 variables, separately. Five MLMs were conducted with GAD-Q-IV score
predicting each L1 variable while controlling for both gender and CES-D score. Continuous
predictor variables were grand mean-centered so that parameters reflect effects of deviations
above the sample average level of GAD symptoms (and depression). Table 3 shows the fixed
effects of gender, depression symptoms, and GAD symptoms, and the random intercept
predicting each of the L1 variables.
The results showed that the random intercepts were significant in every model, thus
indicating that L1 outcomes varied across participants. The effect of gender was non-significant
in every model (p’s > .497). Contrary to hypotheses, there were no significant predictors of
others’ dominant behavior (p’s > .521) nor of valence (p’s > .504). Contrary to hypotheses,
higher levels of GAD symptoms predicted both lower perceptions of others’ cold behavior and
lower perceptions of immoral behavior. Unexpectedly, GAD symptoms did not predict arousal,
valence, or perceptions of others’ dominant behavior, whereas higher depression symptoms
predicted higher arousal and marginally higher perceptions of cold behavior. Finally, all the
effects fell below the MDES at the present study’s level of power for detecting L2 direct effects
(.27; Arend & Schafer, 2019). Consequently, I must consider the possibility that the significant
effects of GAD symptoms predicting perceived cold behavior and perceived immoral behavior
may be ‘false positives’. In addition, the remaining null effects may have failed to be detected
due to a lack of statistical power.
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Direct Effects of Perceptions of Dominant, Cold, and Immoral Behavior on Arousal and
Valence
Four MLMs were conducted to predict arousal and valence when including all main
effects (between- and within-person) and interactions. Each outcome was tested in a stepwise
manner with the main effects entered in the first block and GAD interaction effects entered in the
second block. The effect of gender was non-significant for all MLMs and therefore is not
discussed further, but the effect is still presented in Tables 4 and 5. Furthermore, only the results
of block 2 for each MLM are presented in the following sections, unless otherwise noted.
Predicting Arousal
The results (see Table 4) showed not only significant variability in intercepts but also in
slopes between predictors and arousal. Contrary to hypothesis 2a, GAD symptoms did not
predict arousal. Furthermore, the standardized effect size fell below the MDES for a L2 direct
effect. Unexpectedly, depression symptoms predicted higher arousal with a small effect size (~
.10). Contrary to hypothesis 3a, mean perceived dominant behavior did not predict arousal.
Furthermore, this effect fell below the MDES for a L1 direct effect. As hypothesized, mean
perceived cold behavior predicted higher arousal (H4a) with a medium effect size. Contrary to
hypothesis 5a, mean perceived immoral behavior predicted lower arousal in block 1. When the
interaction terms were included (block 2), mean perceived immoral behavior only predicted
marginally lower arousal. Although the effect size for this latter result was small, the present
study had sufficient power to detect this effect.
Regarding within-person effects, contrary to hypothesis 3c, person-centered perceived
dominant behavior predicted lower arousal. As hypothesized, person-centered perceived cold
behavior and person-centered perceived immoral behavior both predicted higher arousal (H4c
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and H5c, respectively). Each of these standardized effect sizes were small, and the latter result
fell below the MDES for a L1 direct effect.
Surprisingly, the results showed that none of interaction effects of GAD symptoms with
mean social perceptions or person-mean centered perceptions were statistically significant (p’s >
.115). Therefore, hypotheses 6a, 6c, 7a, 7c, 8a, and 8c were not supported. There was a small
effect size for the interaction between GAD symptoms with person-centered perceived immoral
behavior. However, all of these results fell below the MDES.
Predicting Valence
Significant variability in intercepts and all slopes confirmed differences between
participants’ average valence and within-person associations of perceptions and valence.
Contrary to hypothesis 2b, GAD symptoms did not predict valence, nor did depression
symptoms. Additionally, both effect sizes were small and fell below the MDES for L2 direct
effects. As hypothesized, mean perceptions of dominant, cold, and immoral behavior each
predicted lower valence (H3b, H4b, and H5b, respectively) with small (mean perceived
dominant behavior) to medium effect sizes (mean perceived cold and immoral behaviors).
However, the effect size of mean perceived dominant behavior fell below the MDES. In
addition, person-centered perceptions of dominant, cold, and immoral behavior each predicted
lower valence with small (perceptions of dominant behavior) to medium (perceptions of cold and
immoral behaviors) effect sizes, thus supporting hypotheses 3d, 4d, and 5d, respectively. Each of
these L1 direct effects met or exceeded the MDES.
Regarding the interaction effects, GAD did not moderate mean dominance in predicting
valence. Therefore, hypothesis 7b was not supported. Furthermore, GAD did not moderate any
of the person-centered social perception dimensions in predicting valence, thereby failing to
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support hypotheses 6d, 7d, and 8d. These CLI effect sizes were also very small (> .03). However,
GAD symptoms showed a significant and small-sized CLI with average ratings of others cold
behavior. Simple slopes follow up analyses showed that, contrary to hypothesis 7d, GAD
symptoms buffered the relationship between perceived cold behavior and valence (Figure 5). For
participants with low levels of GAD symptoms, one’s average perceptions of others’ cold
behavior predicted lower valence (b = -24.17, SE = 5.44, p < .001, 95%CI [-34.92, -13.43]). In
contrast, individuals with high levels of GAD symptoms showed no relationship between
average ratings of cold behavior and valence (b = -1.29, SE = 5.26, p = .806, 95% CI [-11.69,
9.10]). Furthermore, compared to low GAD symptom participants, individuals with high GAD
symptoms reported lower valence at all levels of perceived affiliative-cold behavior. Figure 5
shows a plot of the simple slopes analysis.
Figure 5
Plot of simple slopes analysis – GAD symptoms buffering the relationship between mean
perceived cold behavior and valence.
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There was also a statistically significant interaction between GAD symptoms and average
perceived immoral behavior in predicting valence. This result also had a small standardized
effect size. As hypothesized, GAD symptoms strengthened the relationship between perceived
immoral behavior and valence (H8d). Simple slopes follow up analysis revealed that at low
levels of GAD symptoms the relationship between average perceived immoral behavior and
valence was not significant (b = -4.39, SE = 5.36, t = -.82, p = .41, 95%CI [-14.97, 6.19]). At
high levels of GAD symptoms, perceived immoral behavior predicted lower valence (b = -23.24,
SE = 4.79, p < .001, 95% CI [-32.71, -13.77]). Figure 6 shows a plot of the simple slope analysis
of the interaction between GAD symptoms and mean perceived immoral behavior predicting
valence.
Figure 6
Plot of simple slopes analysis – GAD symptoms strengthening the relationship between mean
perceived immoral behavior and valence.
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When considered together these results indicate that participants who reported higher
average ratings of dominant, cold, and immoral behaviors tended to report lower valence. When
participants’ ratings of dominant, cold, and immoral behavior deviated above their own means,
they reported additional decreases in valence. However, perceptions of others as cold predict
lower valence only for low-GAD participants, whereas perceived immorality predicted lower
valence most strongly for high-GAD participants. Said differently, GAD buffered the
relationship between average ratings of cold behavior and valence, whereas GAD strengthened
the relationship between average ratings of immoral behavior and valence.
CHAPTER IV
Discussion
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the present study was to examine effects of perceptions of others’
interpersonal behaviors on self-reported affective reaction over the course of naturalistic selfreported interpersonal interactions, and the extent to which GAD symptoms moderated these
effects. Specifically, individuals with higher GAD symptoms were expected to report higher
arousal and lower valence when perceiving behaviors conceptualized as interpersonal threats, at
both the between-person and within-person levels. Perceptions of others’ interpersonal behaviors
were divided into the three dimensions of dominance, affiliation, and morality. The interpersonal
behaviors were based on the two existing IPC dimensions (dominance and affiliation) and a
hypothesized third dimension (morality). Affective reaction was comprised of arousal and
valence, the two orthogonal axes of the affect grid. It was theorized that dominant, low affiliative
(cold), and immoral interpersonal behaviors might function as interpersonal threats, which would
be evidenced by more instances of high arousal and low valence affective responses across the
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participants. Furthermore, GAD was hypothesized to predict more instances of each
interpersonal threat and the associated responses, as well as to strengthen these relationships.
Major Findings
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms Predicting Social Perceptions
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms did not predict perceptions of dominance. This
finding is inconsistent with the literature, as previous studies have found that individuals with
GAD tend to perceive others’ behavior as dominant, cold, and cold-dominant (Newman &
Erickson, 2010; Erickson & Pincus, 2005). For example, within contrived laboratory social
interactions with a confederate, participants with GAD symptoms perceived the confederate as
more blaming, controlling, attacking, and ignoring, and less loving, trusting, and connecting
(Erickson & Pincus, 2005). However, findings regarding the “pathoplasticity” or heterogeneity
of interpersonal problems among people with GAD (Girard et al., 2017; Gomez Penedo,
Constantino, Coyne, Westra, & Antony, 2017; Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008)
suggest that interpersonal heterogeneity may obscure any single relationship between GAD
symptoms and perceived dominance. Assuming this is true, then perhaps an effect may have
emerged in the present study if the participants with high GAD symptoms were grouped
according to their predominant interpersonal problems (i.e., intrusive type, exploitable type, cold
type, and nonassertive type; Przeworski et al., 2011).
Alternatively, perhaps differences in the study context contributed to the present results.
Previous research has assessed interpersonal problems by examining in-vivo laboratory selfreports while interacting with confederates (Erickson & Newman, 2007) or with self-report
questionnaires of trait interpersonal problems at one (Girard et al., 2017; Przeworski et al.,
2011), two (Salzer et al., 2008), or three time points (Gomez Penedo et al., 2017). However, the
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present study measured perceptions of interpersonal behaviors across 30 naturalistic social
interactions, which might “wash out” effects of particular stressors given the broad range of
possible situations assessed. It is also possible that participants in the present study reported on
more interactions with friends and acquaintances, rather than strangers (this information was
captured but not analyzed in the present study), which may have affected the results. In addition,
as discussed further below, the individuals with GAD symptoms reported greater perceptions of
affiliative and moral behavior. If they experienced their interacting partners as affiliative and
moral, perhaps this was associated with less apparent dominance among the participants’
interacting partners. Although additional research is needed to replicate a null finding with
respect to perceived dominance among individuals with GAD symptoms, it is possible that
individuals with GAD symptoms may be sensitive to perceived dominance, but only with certain
people.
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms predicted higher, rather than lower, perceived
affiliative behavior. In addition, the effect size fell below the MDES for a L2 direct effect (.27;
Arend & Schafer, 2019), meaning that the current study was not amply powered to accurately
detect this effect and thus this finding should be interpreted with caution, as it may be a false
positive. Despite power concerns, the finding is inconsistent with the literature. As mentioned
above, some studies found individuals with GAD symptoms to perceive others in a manner that
is interpersonally threatening (i.e., cold and controlling; Erickson & Pincus, 2005; Newman &
Erickson, 2010), which is what I hypothesized would occur for individuals with GAD symptoms
across naturalistic interpersonal interactions. However, past research has largely relied on selfreported generalized perceptions of threats and on one-time lab studies. Given our divergent
findings in repeated social interactions, perhaps individuals with higher GAD symptoms in the
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present study tended to surround themselves with others with whom they can be affiliative
because it is more reassuring (i.e., avoiding individuals they perceive as unaffiliative). Indeed,
prior research has shown that individuals with GAD reported engaging in higher levels of
reassurance seeking as a safety behavior to control their worrying, uncertainty, or anxiety
(Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012; Cougle et al., 2011), even pulling for reassurance from confederates
within a laboratory task (Erickson & Newman, 2007). Therefore, the higher levels of perceived
affiliative behaviors among individuals with high GAD symptoms may reflect this interpersonal
coping strategy. An alternate interpretation is that perhaps worriers use appraisals of affiliation as
a means of anxiety avoidance. If perceiving others’ cold behavior (which may threaten lack of
belongingness) or neutral behavior (which may trigger intolerance of uncertainty; Holaway,
Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Lee et al., 2010) is threatening, it may be that individuals with GAD
symptoms appraise cold and neutral behavior as affiliative to avoid experiencing anxiety and
uncertainty.
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD positively predicted higher, rather than lower, perceptions
of moral behavior. This effect also fell below Arend and Schafer’s (2019) MDES for a L2 direct
effect (.27), thus warranting caution when interpreting this result. Still, the result is partially
inconsistent with the literature. It did not align with the notion that GAD would be associated
with higher instances of perceiving threats to moral contamination. However, this result does fit
with the notion that individuals with GAD are prone to excessive reassurance seeking (BeesdoBaum et al., 2012; Cougle et al., 2011). If this is so, then the person with GAD symptoms may
perceive the reassuring person’s behavior as cooperative, which is an act that previous research
has shown that humans generally consider moral (Curry, Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019).
Alternatively, similar to the aforementioned interpretation of higher appraisals of affiliative
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behavior, perhaps the higher appraisals of moral behavior also functioned as anxiety avoidance;
worriers tended to appraise immoral and neutral behavior as moral to avoid perceiving a threat or
sparking uncertainty, respectively.
With respect to the conceptualization of perceived interpersonal threats, both significant
main effects – GAD predicting high affiliative behavior and high moral behavior – were in the
opposite direction from what was hypothesized. However, in some regards, these results may be
consistent with previous research. For instance, individuals with GAD often tend to report
interpersonal problems with being too affiliative (Erickson et al., 2016; Shin & Newman, 2019;
Zainal & Newman, 2017). In addition, Erickson and colleagues (2018) found that individuals
with GAD tended to rate themselves as higher in compassionate motivations and Hebert and
colleagues (2014) identified that worriers tend to hold the belief that worrying is a moral action.
The present results in combination with previous studies might suggest a propensity of worriers
to hold a bias toward appraising interpersonal stimuli as affiliative and moral, whether in
themselves or others. For instance, Shin and Newman (2019) found that individuals with GAD
over-reported themselves as behaving in affiliative ways, whereas informants reported the GAD
individuals were less affiliative. The prior findings about worriers appraising their own behaviors
as affiliative and moral may extend also to how they appraise others’ behaviors. Clearly,
additional research is needed to better understand these discrepancies in naturalistic interpersonal
interactions.
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms Predicting Affective Arousal and Valence
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms did not predict arousal. This is inconsistent with
the literature. The diagnostic criteria of GAD includes somatic symptoms associated with
physiological arousal (APA, 2013). Furthermore, several studies have shown heightened arousal
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in individuals with GAD symptoms (Ottaviani et al., 2014; Stapinski et al., 2010; Hoffman et al.,
2005; Aldao, Mennin, & McLaughlin, 2013; Aldao et al., 2010). However, given that worry in
GAD has been theorized in some cases to help individuals avoid arousal (Borkovec, Alcaine, &
Behar, 2004) or perhaps more precisely to help them avoid additional increases in arousal (i.e., a
negative contrast; Newman & Llera, 2011), perhaps the present results are evidence of successful
attempts by individuals with GAD symptoms to maintain consistent negative affective states in
order to avoid further expected increase in negative mood (e.g., negative emotional contrasts).
This is consistent with prior research showing that more intense worrying throughout daily life
predicted higher sustained arousal over the next hour (Newman et al, 2019). Said differently, if
the participants in the present study were already in a chronically aroused state that did not vary
in response to others’ interpersonal behaviors, then the present null finding may indicate they
successfully suppressed increases in arousal during interactions. However, I would still have
expected to find worriers reporting higher arousal across interactions. Despite these effects of
GAD symptoms, depression symptoms predicted higher arousal with a large enough effect size
to exceed post-hoc MDES (see Arend & Schafer, 2019). This significant covariate effect
indicates that, if worriers had been experiencing increased arousal, they would likely have
reported it. However, additional research is needed to disentangle the effects of daily worry on
subsequent interpersonal interactions.
While not the focus of the present study, the covariate depression predicted higher
arousal, even after controlling for the effects of GAD and social perceptions. This effect was
surprising given that depression has been associated with decreased arousal to negative stimuli
(Rosebrock et al., 2016) and perceived threats (Yancey et al., 2014). Perhaps when controlling
for the shared variance of negative affect in GAD symptoms and depression symptoms, the
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remaining effect of depression symptoms likely reflected primarily low positive affect (Gençöz,
2002).
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms did not predict lower valence across social
interactions. This is inconsistent with the literature and inconsistent with the previous results. For
instance, GAD has been associated with elevated negative affect, even after successful attempts
at coping and reduction in negative affect (Fitzgerald et al., 2017), however this pattern did not
show up in the present results. If the individuals with GAD symptoms are perceiving more
affiliative and moral behavior then we might also expect them to feel higher valence.
Perceived Dominant Behavior Predicting Affect
Contrary to hypotheses, mean perceptions of dominant behavior did not predict arousal.
However, as hypothesized, participants who reported higher mean (chronic) perceptions of
dominant behavior reported lower valence. This result is partially consistent with the literature.
However, it must be noted that the literature also appears to be mixed regarding the relationship
between dominance and arousal and valence. The non-significant correlation between perceived
dominance and arousal and valence is consistent with prior research (Cain et al., 2019; Killgore,
1998), but the null effect of dominance on arousal stands in contrast to past findings that show
interacting with a dominant person tends to increase autonomic nervous system activity
(Cordonier, Breton, Trouche, & Van der Henst, 2017). Other research has shown that, people
who identify with submissive interaction partners tend to report lower valence when perceiving
dominance (Demaree, Robinson, Everhart, & Youngstrom, 2005). In one study, when
individuals self-identified as possessing dominant traits, then they reported lower valence when
engaged in submissive behaviors; however, participants who identified as possessing submissive
traits did not show any significant patterns of valence (Moskowitz & Coté, 1995).
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Another study by Stevanovic, Henttonen, Kahri, and Koski (2019) found differential
effects of dominance on same-sex interacting partners. Importantly, they found that dominance
showed an effect on reported arousal only during the beginning of the social encounter. This
highlights an important limitation of the present study. Participants reported retrospectively on
social interactions, the recall of which were likely to be influenced by peak and end effects
(Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993; Stone, Broderick, Kaell, DelesPaul, &
Porter, 2000), meaning that I would expect participants to base their recollections on the peak
affect experienced and how they felt at the end of the interactions. However, if perceived
dominance exerts influence largely at the commencement of an interaction, then participants
would be less likely to remember these details, thus contributing to the null effect of perceived
dominance on reported arousal. Alternatively, the effect of dominance on valence was found
primarily with the female participants (Stevanovic et al., 2019); valence increased when the
interacting partner exhibited greater dominance in an interaction, whereas valence decreased
when the participant felt they needed to exert more dominance during the interaction. Given that
the present sample consisted predominantly of female participants, the effect of perceived
dominance on valence may parallel that found by Stevanovic and colleagues.
Contrary to hypotheses, within-person increases in perceived dominance predicted lower,
rather than higher, arousal. However, as hypothesized, within-person increases in perceived
dominance predicted lower valence. These findings are inconsistent with the results of other
recent studies. For instance, dominant behavior has been shown to increase physiological arousal
during interactions (Cordonier et al., 2017). In another study, Cain and colleagues (2019) found
that participants were more likely to behave in a friendly (communal & dominant) manner when
they perceived others’ behavior as communal and dominant.
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Alternatively, perhaps low arousal and low valence implies that the participants
experienced a different emotion, rather than fear or anxiety, in response to perceived dominant
behavior. For instance, Hepach, Kliemann, Grüneisen, Heekeren, and Dziobek (2011) classified
62 emotions in relation to their scores on arousal and valence as well as their frequency in
everyday conversations. They found five emotions that were comprised of both low arousal and
low valence: boredom, compassion, embarrassment, melancholia, and humility. Interestingly,
each of these emotions were found to have similar frequencies experienced throughout daily life,
except for humility, which had lower daily frequency than the other emotions. Accordingly, the
affective response observed in the present study may reflect the experience of one of these
emotions in response to perceiving dominant behavior. However, future research is needed to
better understand a lower arousal and lower valence response to perceived dominant behavior.
I had conceptualized perceived dominance as an interpersonal threat, which was
theorized to result in within-person increases in arousal and decreases in valence. However, the
present results suggest that participants may have been more sensitive to perceived submissive
behavior, about which they may have felt excited (high arousal and high valence). Or perhaps,
the participants may have felt embarrassed (decreased arousal and decreased valence; Hepach et
al., 2011) when perceiving dominant behavior.
It is also noteworthy that the mean or “aggregate” effects differed slightly from the
within-person fluctuations in response to perceived dominant behavior. The lower valence in
response to perceived dominance was consistent at both the between- and within-person levels.
However, the mean (between-person) effects of perceived dominance did not result in any
change in arousal, whereas the state (within-person) effects resulted in lower arousal, which was
in the opposite direction from what was expected. Perhaps the mean effect reflected displeasure
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when interacting frequently with dominant interaction partners, and perhaps the within-person
effect reflected the experience of embarrassment in response to being confronted with dominant
behavior.
Perceived Cold Behavior Predicting Affect
As hypothesized, higher average perceptions of cold behavior predicted higher arousal
and lower valence. Similarly, as hypothesized, higher within-person increases in perceived cold
behavior predicted both higher arousal and lower valence. These results support the theory that
cold behaviors function as interpersonal threats, both generally and within specific interactions.
The between-person effects suggest that experiencing colder social interactions on
average may be associated with lack of belongingness and social connectedness. While
experiencing social connection has been linked with mental wellness (Seppala, Rossomondo, &
Doty, 2013), the lack thereof is a risk factor for mental illness symptoms (Saeri, Cruwys, Barlow,
Stronge, & Sibley, 2018) including anxiety, depression, substance use, and maladaptive attitudes
toward food (Richardson, Elliott, & Roberts, 2017). The reciprocal has also been shown, that
mental health symptoms predicted subsequent lack of social connectedness (Saeri et al., 2018).
The within-person effects suggest that when in interactions, perceiving colder behaviors
results in an increase in arousal and decreased valence. Therefore, it may be experienced as an
acute interpersonal threat to belongingness when the other individual behaves in a cold way.
Alternatively, the effect of affiliative behavior resulting in lower arousal and higher valence may
indicate that participants felt reassured (comforted) by others behaving warmly. Indeed, research
and theory points to the seriousness of social connectedness such that individuals with low social
connectedness have a higher incidence of depression, generalized anxiety, suicidal ideation,
cigarette smoking (Beutel et al., 2017), and a 50% higher risk for mortality (Häfner et al., 2012).

55

Therefore, perceiving behaviors that threaten belongingness or social connectedness may quite
literally pose a threat to one’s well-being and life.
Despite these interpretations that supported the theorized conceptualization of
interpersonal threat, it is also possible that interactions evoked alternate states, such as guilt,
shame, or anger when reporting their affect. If this is so, then it implies variations in the meaning
ascribed to perceived behaviors that might contribute to different affective state (Mu &
Berenbaum, 2019). This limitation is due to the affect grid only measuring higher-order affective
classifications rather than discrete emotions. Therefore, a replication of the present study might
utilize measures of several discrete emotions to examine whether perceiving cold interpersonal
behavior does indeed contribute to the affective experience of threat (i.e., fear, anxiety) as
opposed to other negatively-valenced social emotions such as guilt or shame.
Perceived Immoral Behavior Predicting Affect
Contrary to hypotheses, mean perceptions of immoral behavior marginally predicted
lower arousal. This effect may reflect participants having become habituated to perceiving
others’ immoral behavior. Alternatively, a similar effect has been shown in participants
exhibiting decreased arousal when perceiving another person’s pain, if that person was judged as
immoral (Cui, Ma, & Luo, 2016). The effect was theorized to differentiate instances in which it
is least threatening to experience empathy for others’ plight, when the person is perceived as
moral. If the person is judged to be immoral, they may not be trustworthy and thus empathizing
with their pain may be risky.
As hypothesized, mean perceptions of immoral behavior predicted lower valence.
Perhaps these effects reflect, on average, that perceiving more immoral behavior contributed to
the experience of embarrassment, compassion, boredom, humility, or melancholia (Hepach et al.,
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2011). The converse of these effects is also noteworthy, such that participants may have felt joy,
admiration, gratitude, or moral elevation (characterized by positive affect; Algoe & Haidt, 2009)
such that being around others who engaged in moral behaviors may have contributed to the
participants feeling generally uplifted.
As hypothesized, within-person increases in perceived immoral behavior predicted both
higher arousal and lower valence. Taken together, these within-person effects suggest that
perceiving low moral behavior is more interpersonally threatening during social interactions
since they predicted higher arousal and lower valence. This fits with the conceptualization of
immoral behavior functioning as threats of moral contamination. Alternatively, interacting with
someone engaging in moral behavior may be reassuring which decreases arousal and increases
valence.
Interestingly, the between- and within-person effects of perceived immoral behavior on
arousal differed such that average perceived immoral behavior predicted marginally lower
arousal whereas state perceived immoral behavior predicted increased arousal. In contrast,
immoral behavior at both the between- and within-person levels predicted lower valence.
Perhaps these differences may reflect that at the trait level immoral behavior may have
contributed to the experience of embarrassment (low arousal and low valence; Hepach et al.,
2011), whereas at the state level perceiving immoral behavior contributed to the experience of
interpersonal threat. Despite these interpretations, it is again noted that the affect grid measures a
higher-order categorization of emotion and does not lend itself to parsing apart specific emotions
– such as fear, guilt, or shame – that participants may have experienced that resulted in similar
ratings on the affect grid but arise from alternate interpretations of the same kind of behavior and
result in different action tendencies once evoked.
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Random Intercepts and Slopes Predicting Arousal and Valence
As hypothesized, the random effects of person-mean centered perceived dominant, cold,
and immoral behavior showed significant variance across participants in predicting arousal and
valence. Said differently, each participant had their own mean level of arousal and valence as
well as their own pattern of fluctuations in response to perceived dominant, cold, and immoral
behaviors. These findings are consistent with the literature. Each person is expected to have their
own average level of affect (Schwartz & Stone, 1998; Tiede, 2019) and perceptions of behavior
(e.g., Wright et al., 2017).
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms Moderating the Relationship Between Perceived
Interpersonal Behaviors and Arousal
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD did not moderate any of the relationships between average
perceptions of dominant, cold, or immoral behaviors predicting arousal. In addition, GAD did
not moderate any of the within-person fluctuations in person-centered perceived dominant, cold,
or immoral behavior predicting arousal. These results are consistent with the prior result reported
earlier – the main effect of GAD symptoms did not predict arousal – but are inconsistent with the
literature on GAD. The diagnostic criteria for GAD includes symptoms involving physiological
arousal (e.g., feeling on edge, difficulty concentrating, muscle tension; APA, 2013). Moreover,
research on GAD has frequently shown that it includes heightened physiological arousal
(Ottaviani et al., 2014; Stapinski et al., 2010; Hoffman et al., 2005; Aldao, Mennin, &
McLaughlin, 2013; Aldao et al., 2010). However, other studies have shown that GAD symptoms
predicted lower arousal symptoms suggesting that worry functions to suppress increases in
arousal (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998). Therefore, it is surprising that the present study

58

found no moderating effect of GAD on the relationship between social perceptions and affective
arousal.
However, there are alternate interpretations that may explain the present results. First,
perhaps the arousal experienced by individuals who worry occurs largely outside of interpersonal
interactions. Indeed, the DSM-5 states that individuals with GAD tend to worry more about
ongoing relationships rather than negative evaluation within social interactions, thus
differentiating it from social anxiety disorder (APA, 2013). Second, perhaps these results lend
support to the theory that situation-specific factors are better predictors of behavior (in this case
arousal) than are traits (e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 1995). For instance, perhaps GAD did not
influence appraisals of others’ behaviors and the resultant affect, or perhaps the three
interpersonal domains assessed (dominance, affiliation, and morality) are not particularly salient
to individuals with GAD symptoms with respect to their reported level of arousal. However, this
is unlikely because the IPC dimensions dominance and affiliation have been shown to be transdiagnostic, and previous research has shown that worriers report behaviors that vary in
dominance and affiliation (Erickson & Newman, 2007; Erickson et al., 2016).
Third, we did not measure arousal related specifically to GAD symptoms. Instead we
chose to utilize the affect grid because it is a single item measure of affect that reduces
participant burden across multiple surveys. This permitted the assessment of affective arousal
more generally, which was assumed to be applicable to all the participants regardless of
psychiatric diagnoses. However, perhaps a measure that is targeted specifically to physiological
arousal related to GAD should be used in future research. Perhaps such a measure would be
more sensitive to fluctuations in arousal that is specifically related to GAD in naturalistic
interactions.
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For instance, Sadikaj and colleagues (2013) asked participants to rate the degree to which
they responded with 12 a-priori specified behaviors during social interactions. Scott and
colleagues (2017) asked participants whether they had perceived specific behaviors (i.e.,
rejection, criticism) and responded with specific urges or behaviors (i.e., aggressive or
threatening behavior). As such, these authors’ measures of affect and behaviors were more
directly relevant to their target population, whereas the present study permitted participants to
rate their perceptions using three Likert scales and freely indicate their affective arousal and
valence on the affect grid.
Fourth, perhaps the present results provide evidence that GAD is not associated with
affective arousal in interpersonal interaction, whereas another trait variable would. For instance,
considering that the covariate depression showed a significant direct effect on arousal, perhaps
depression is a trait variable that would moderate these relationships between social perceptions
and arousal. Future research should investigate this. If findings support that, then it would add to
the literature on the differential state-level effects of different types of symptoms (i.e., depressive
versus anxiety).
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms Moderating the Relationship Between Perceived
Interpersonal Behaviors and Valence
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD did not moderate the relationship between average
perceptions of dominant behavior predicting valence. This result is inconsistent with the
literature. Prior studies have shown that individuals with GAD tend to perceive others’ behavior
as cold and dominant (Erickson & Newman, 2007). As discussed previously, perhaps
interpersonal pathoplasticity among individuals with GAD symptoms (e.g., Przeworski et al.,
2011) obscured the detection of an effect of GAD symptoms with perceived dominant behavior.
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Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms buffered the relationship between average levels
of cold behaviors and valence. While the moderating effect of GAD was significant, it was in the
opposite direction from what was predicted. Participants with high GAD symptoms reported an
equally low valence regardless of their average perceptions of cold (or affiliative) behaviors. In
addition, participants with high GAD symptoms reported overall lower valence than did
participants with low GAD symptoms. Alternatively, for participants who reported low levels of
GAD symptoms, valence was negatively related to average perceptions of cold behavior, such
that participants with low average perceptions of cold behavior reported higher valence than
participants with high average perceptions of cold behavior. Although this effect was not
hypothesized, it suggests that higher GAD symptoms were related to lower valence and no
differences in valence between average affiliative versus distancing behavior. Said differently,
GAD symptoms appeared to dampen the overall effect of perceiving more affiliative behaviors
on valence such that these individuals do not experience increases in positive affect from
associating more frequently with affiliative people. This result is consistent with research on
social disconnection in that mere socializing does not necessarily meet the need for
belongingness and connection, but rather that close relationships in which one can confide are
more pertinent (see Seppala et al., 2013 for a review). While no studies were found that
examined the relationship between social disconnection and GAD, Cruwys and colleagues
(2014) found that belonging to a valued social group decreased depression symptoms over time,
and to a lesser extent decreased anxiety symptoms. Perhaps the present findings suggest that
individuals with GAD symptoms may too experience greater difficulties feeling connected with
others, particularly if the GAD symptoms contribute to low valence regardless of how affiliative
others behaved. Alternatively, this finding also supports the contrast avoidance model of GAD
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(Newman & Llera, 2011). Participants with high GAD symptoms may have worried to maintain
low valence as to avoid being surprised by a sudden, unexpected shift in their emotional state.
As hypothesized, GAD symptoms strengthened the relationship between average
perceptions of immoral behavior and valence. Participants with high levels of GAD symptoms
differed in their level of valence based on their average perceptions of immoral behavior;
individuals who perceived more immoral behavior reported lower valence than individuals who
perceived more moral behavior. However, participants who endorsed low levels of GAD
symptoms reported low valence, regardless of how moral they perceived others’ behavior on
average. The individuals with lower GAD symptoms did not differ in levels of reported valence
between high and low mean perceptions of immoral behavior. However, GAD symptoms
contributed to being more susceptible to feeling worse when perceiving immoral behavior. Such
a sensitivity to the morality of others’ behavior resembles scrupulosity or may reflect the
consequences of having been raised in a family in which sensitivity to moral behaviors was
highly reinforced, even to the point of leading to anxiety from “overactive sensitivities” to moral
concerns (Miller & Hedges, 2008, p. 1048). Indeed, comorbidity between scrupulosity OCD and
GAD have been found to be just under 20% (Rasmussen, Siev, Abramovitch, & Wilhelm, 2016).
Sample characteristics may have also contributed to this finding, as the participants were
undergraduates from a private, religious university. Therefore, the likelihood of the worried
participants having been reared with “overactive sensitivities” to moral behaviors is increased
compared to a secular university or community sample.
It is noteworthy that the moderating effects of GAD with mean cold behavior differed
from the moderating effect with mean immoral behavior in predicting valence. GAD symptoms
appeared to blunt the positive effects of perceiving affiliative behavior whereas it strengthened
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the effect of perceiving moral behavior. The non-worried participants who engaged primarily in
interactions with people whose behavior they perceived as warm reported feeling best (on
average) compared to all other non-worried participants. In contrast, worried participants who
interacted mostly with moral people reported feeling better than all the other worried
participants. These results could reflect differences in psychological needs between worried and
non-worried individuals. As worry severity increases, people may have more difficulty
experiencing relatedness and belongingness with others. In addition, high worry may include
concerns about feeling unsafe with others unless surrounded by people whom the worrier
determines to be trustworthy and a positive influence (i.e., are perceived to exhibit high moral
behavior). Another possible synthesis of these discrepant findings may be explained as a function
of intolerance of uncertainty interacting with perceived trustworthiness. Research has shown that
worriers are particularly sensitive to uncertainty and thus worry is an attempt to generate more
control (Holaway et al, 2006; Lee et al., 2010). Social interactions are replete with uncertainties
(e.g., not knowing whether a person’s motives are benign or malicious), regardless of the level of
affiliativeness (or coldness) of the other person’s behavior. Consequently, the individual with
GAD symptoms must navigate these uncertainties, which may result in experiencing low valence
in response to both others’ affiliative and cold behaviors if the worrier is concerned the other
person’s intent has negative implications for the worrier. Alternatively, appraising another
person as trustworthy (i.e., interpreting their intent as benign), based on their moral behaviors,
may increase certainty within an interaction thus increasing a sense of safety and therefore
positive affect in individuals with GAD symptoms. Then perhaps individuals with high GAD
symptoms who interacted more frequently with trustworthy people felt better than those
individuals who interacted with others low in trustworthiness. Granted, neither perceived
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uncertainty nor trustworthiness were measured in the present study, therefore additional research
is needed to test these interpretations.
These differing effects further justify examining moral components of GAD apart from
merely the affiliative (i.e., social) components of GAD. Furthermore, the present results provide
additional support that affiliation and morality are two distinct dimensions with unique functions
within interpersonal interactions and may interact differently with different trait variables, like
worry. Future research should further explore the relationship between morality and GAD,
especially regarding moral behavior as a perpetuating factor as well as a protective factor.
Lastly, contrary to hypotheses GAD symptoms did not moderate the relationships
between state fluctuations in perceived dominant, cold, or immoral behavior in predicting
valence. Given the present pattern of results, GAD symptoms behaved only like an individual
difference variable explaining trait differences in perceptions of others’ behaviors and valence.
However, GAD did not appear to influence state-level patterns of affective responses to
perceived interpersonal behaviors. Perhaps the state-level changes in perceptions were not
specific enough to GAD symptoms, whereas a variable like perceptions of negative contrasts
(see Llera & Newman, 2010) may be more likely to be endorsed by individuals with GAD
symptoms.
Implications
Clinical Implications
The present results have implications for existing interpersonal models of GAD.
Although previous research has shown broadly that GAD symptoms are associated with
perceptions of others as cold and dominant in a brief interaction with strangers (Erickson &
Newman, 2007), the present results added nuanced and contrasting evidence by investigating
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naturalistic social interactions. Firstly, the present study found no effect of GAD symptoms
predicting perceptions of dominant behavior. Second, compared to participants who endorsed
low levels of GAD symptoms, those with high levels of GAD symptoms appeared to show more
sensitivity to the (im)morality of others’ behavior and less sensitivity to others’ affiliative (or
distancing) behavior. As mentioned previously, the interaction with affiliation is aligned with the
contrast avoidance model (CAM) of GAD (Newman & Llera, 2011). Furthermore, the present
results might imply that perhaps negative contrasts are not experienced as equally threatening.
For instance, within the CAM framework, the risk of rejection or lack of belongingness (i.e., low
affiliation) from others appeared to be more threatening than the (im)morality of others’
behavior. Consequently, if low affiliation is considered threatening, then worrying to maintain
low valence may help the individual protect themselves from such anticipated negative
consequences, regardless if the other person’s behavior is affiliative or distancing.
Clinical researchers have increasingly been integrating into GAD treatment a focus on
interpersonal behaviors (e.g., Erickson, Newman, & McGuire, 2014). Therefore, the present
results hold clinical implications for individuals with GAD symptoms as well as regarding
appraisals of interpersonal threats. Compared to those participants who perceived more overall
immoral behavior, the individuals with high GAD symptoms who perceived more instances of
moral behavior reported experiencing higher valence in social interactions. Therefore, a possible
therapeutic intervention may be to help clients with GAD symptoms practice noticing the
morality of others’ behaviors. Such an intervention may consist of a mindfulness practice, such
as to mindfully notice others’ benevolent intentions underlying their behaviors. Alternatively, the
intervention may be a cognitive behavioral therapy (Beck, 2011) intervention to think of
alternate adaptive thoughts when their maladaptive thoughts arise in social interactions.
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For clients regardless of GAD status, when therapists are exploring a client’s experience
of threatening interpersonal interactions, the therapist may assess whether the perceived
interpersonal behavior was predominantly submissive, cold, or immoral. Therapists may help
them navigating interpersonal groups to maximize the affiliative and moral individuals they
surround themselves with and decrease time spent with individuals who engage in cold and
immoral behaviors. Based on the present results, the expected effects would be an increase in
affective valence. Similarly, therapists may examine whether their clients behave interpersonally
in ways that perpetuate cold and immoral behaviors from others during social interactions. This
may contribute to the maintenance of negative affect. Additionally, perhaps social shame may be
a treatment target, particularly when interacting with individuals who are perceived as more
dominant that oneself. Acceptance-based strategies (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2012) may
improve perceived control and tolerance of shame within interactions with a dominant social
partner.
If high-GAD individuals avoid anxiety by appraising cold, immoral, and neutral behavior
instead as affiliative and moral, then therapists may help their clients by increasing acceptance of
the anxiety and uncertainty that may arise from objectively appraising others’ behavior as cold,
immoral, or neutral. Such a pattern may necessitate identifying the underlying beliefs that keep
anxiety and uncertainty so aversive. An intervention may be to help individuals with GAD
symptoms improve the objectivity of their appraisals of others’ interpersonal behaviors.
Therapists must simultaneously be wary of the client resorting to anxiety avoidance
strategies, namely reassurance-seeking. This may be common among worriers when they
disclose their worries to others, they may fail to address their core fear thus continuing to spark
worry and additional reassurance-seeking. As such, an important avenue may be for therapists to
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teach GAD clients how to seek social support from others that does not perpetuate experiential
avoidance and maintain their worry over time.
Limitations and Future Research
There are several limitations of the present research that deserve mentioning. The present
sample consisted entirely of college undergraduates, many whom were Caucasian and female. In
addition, the sample was recruited from a private, religious university. These features may limit
the generalizability of the present results. In addition, this may have resulted recruiting
participants with a heightened sensitivity to appraisals of moral behavior. In contrast, individuals
from a secular university or from the community may not show such a sensitivity to perceiving
the morality of interpersonal behavior. However, prior research and theory (e.g., Goodwin et al.,
2014; Pizarro et al., 2011) conceptualized the moral dimension in way that implies most people,
regardless of religious affiliation, would be sensitive to the morality of interpersonal behavior.
Regardless, replication of the study is warranted with other samples from different social
contexts to identify differential sensitivity to the perceived morality of interpersonal behavior.
Participants completed Likert scales rating the quality of other peoples’ behaviors rather
than choosing concrete categories of behaviors. This was done to flexibly assess the IPC
dimensions without a-priori assuming which specific behaviors participants would constitute as
belonging in each category. Furthermore, the Likert scales permitted greater variance given their
use as continuous – rather than categorical – predictor variables. Another limitation is that the
social perceptions ratings were coarsely-grained compared to the affect grid dimensions. This
may have reduced variability and suppressed effects. However, given that effects and
interactions emerged among the L1 predictors, this measurement issue may not be to blame.
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Notwithstanding, future research should measure social perceptions and affect ratings using the
same scaling.
There were several limitations regarding the daily diary procedure that are worth noting.
First, surveys asked participants to self-report on a recent interpersonal interaction, but my
research team did not assess the amount of time that had elapsed between the interaction and
completion of a given survey. Furthermore, there was no time-out procedure to limit survey
completion times. Even though surveys were sent to participants on a consistent schedule,
participants did not complete surveys according to that schedule. For instance, in some cases
participants completed multiple days’ worth of surveys in a single day. This was due in part
because of our choice to send links to the surveys via email (or text if participants requested),
which may have taken participants longer to receive than would a text message. This was a
financial constraint because my team had access to Qualtrics, and we did not appropriate funding
to subscribe to a mobile Ecological Momentary Assessment app or pay to have an app developed
for the purposes of this study. Consequently, the data may be subjected to an unknown degree of
recall bias (Singh & Björling, 2019). Furthermore, this variability in survey completion times
prevented me from testing hypotheses regarding lagged time effects, as the amount of time
elapsed between each survey varied considerably, both between and within participants.
One limitation to the statistical interpretation of the results is that I did not specify a
relationship between arousal and valence in analyses (i.e., covariance). Instead, the two
components of the affect grid were tested separately, which limits our understanding of the
relationship between the two. Perhaps an alternative analytic method (e.g., structural equation
modeling) may permit the simultaneous effect of social perceptions on both arousal and valence.
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In addition, the hypothesized models assumed that perceptions of behavior preceded
affective responses, when in fact the causal relationship may have flowed in the reverse
direction. Considerable research has indeed shown that an individual’s affective state influences
their appraisals of a situation (e.g., Lynn, Zhang, & Barrett, 2012). As such, all the effects of
daily diary variables may be interpreted in the opposite direction, in that arousal and valence
predicted perceptions of dominant, cold, and immoral behavior across interactions. Therefore,
future experimental research is needed to support the hypothesized effects that perceptions of
behavior resulted in changes in arousal and valence.
Another limitation to the results was that some of the effect sizes fell below the suggested
MDESs (see Arend & Schafer, 2019). Thus, it is possible that the present study did not have
sufficient power to detect all of the hypothesized effects, resulting in possible Type II error.
Furthermore, some of the present study’s significant effects also fell below the MDES, thus
risking Type I error. Specifically, the direct effects of GAD predicting perceived cold behavior
and perceived immoral behavior were too small at the study’s level of power, and thus should be
interpreted with caution. Additionally, interaction effects such as GAD symptoms moderating
within-person perceived cold behavior predicting arousal was not significant, and it also fell
below the MDES, suggesting that the present study was underpowered to accurately detect this
effect. However, most of the remaining effects exceeded the MDES, indicating that the study
was sufficiently powered to test most of the hypotheses.
Strengths of the present study include a moderately large sample size (N = 161) and
participants completed a large average number of surveys (28.16), which facilitated substantial
power for detecting hypothesized effects. I used well-validated, widely-used instruments for
assessing GAD symptoms and state affect. Regarding the affect grid, having participants select
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their state affect on x and y coordinates – rather than selecting one of 81 boxes in a 9 x 9 grid –
permitted greater variability in the data. In addition, GAD symptom level was treated as a
continuous variable, whereas other studies with similar aims – the effects of psychopathology on
state-level interpersonal interactions – have treated a trait variable of interest as a dichotomous
variable, comparing effects between participants with and without a diagnosis (Sadikaj,
Moskowitz, Russell, Zuroff, & Paris, 2013; Scott et al., 2017; Wright et al., 2017). However, the
procedure used in the present study increased variability, therefore improving power and
maximized the generalizability of results to the entire spectrum of worriers rather than only to
individuals with or without GAD.
Conclusion
The present study expands upon the literature regarding interpersonal behaviors, state
affect, and worry. This is the first known study to conceptualize interpersonal threats according
to three interpersonal dimensions, the two existing dimensions of the interpersonal circumplex
(dominance and affiliation) and a theorized third dimension (morality). Moreover, the results
partially supported the conceptualization of IPC behaviors as interpersonal threats, namely that
cold and immoral behaviors were shown to correspond with ratings of increased arousal and
decreased valence. However, the results showed that perceiving dominant behavior predicted
lower arousal and valence, which suggests that participants may have experienced a different
emotional response, such as shame, boredom, or humility. Furthermore, this study provided
support for the independence of the affiliation and morality dimensions.
This study is one of the few to examine GAD symptoms within daily, naturalistic
interactions. As such, the present results extend the understanding of how GAD symptoms
interact with social perceptions to predict self-reported affect, and also controlled for depression
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as a way to ensure that any effects were not simply to do any form of negative emotionality.
However, the findings supported the predominance of situational factors in predicting state
affect, as GAD symptoms showed no effect on state affect when state social perceptions were in
the model. GAD symptoms did influence between-person effects of social perceptions on
affective valence, but only for the affiliation and morality dimensions. GAD symptoms buffered
the effect of average perceived cold behaviors on valence and strengthened the effect of average
perceived immoral behaviors on valence. Overall, this study offers a novel approach to
researching interpersonal behaviors associated with GAD, through conceptualizing IPC
behaviors according to interpersonal threats. Furthermore, it enhances our understanding of how
GAD symptoms might interact with average social perceptions to maintain symptoms over time,
permitting clinicians to better target interventions toward improving worriers’ quality of social
support.
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Grand means, ranges, and correlations of person means between each study variable (N = 161 participants).
Grand
ICC
Scale
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Mean(SD)
Range
1 Arousalb
-11.12 (39.59)
.12
-96 to 96
2 Valenceb
29.53 (48.13)
.13
-95 to 96a
.03
d
3 Oth Dom
.28 (.90)
.13
-2 to 2
-.05
-.09
4 Oth Coldc
-.84 (1.06)
.14
-2 to 2
.27** -.43**
-.15
5 Oth Immorc
-.60 (.99)
.17
-2 to 2
.06
-.43**
-.09
.63**
6 GAD-Q-IVe
6.16 (3.02)
0 to 12
.08
-.07
.02
-.11
-.16*
7 CES-Df
20.30 (5.35)
10 to 40
.25**
-.07
-.04
.02
-.04
.59**
8 Genderg
.04
.03
.01
-.08
-.03
.14h
.08
†p< .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; aThis range was from a 191x192 pixel rectangle in Qualtrics. b4533 surveys; c4532 surveys; d4530 surveys; e161 participants; f159
participants completed the CES-D; gNot Female = 0 Females = 1; hExcluding the data of the two gender non-binary participants resulted in this correlation
meeting statistical significance (r = .17, p < .05); ICC = Intraclass Correlation Coefficient.

Table 2
Frequencies of perceived interpersonal behaviors within each
dimension across all surveys, out of 4,533 total surveys.
Level
Dimension
(Scale Rating)
Dominance
Affiliation
Morality
High (1 or 2)
1,641
3,109
2,391
Neutral (0)
2,231
858
1,658
Low (-1 or 2)
658
565
483
Note: Three surveys were missing ratings for dominance, two
surveys were missing ratings for affiliation, and one survey was
missing for morality.
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Table 3
Unstandardized and standardized regression weights, standard errors, and confidence intervals for fixed effects & random intercept of GAD symptoms predicting each L1 variable,
controlling for gender and depression symptoms – grand-mean-centered predictors.
Predictor /
Outcome
Covariate
Others’ Dominant Bx
b (SE)
β
95% CI

Others’ Cold Bx
b (SE)
β
95% CI

Others’ Immoral Bx
b (SE)
β
95% CI

Fixed
effects
Intercept

.29 (03)***

-

.23, .34

-.82 (.03)***

-

-.89, -.76

-.60 (.03)***

-

-.76, -.43

Dep Sxs
GAD Sxs

-.004 (.01)
.005 (.01)

-.03
.02

-.02, .01
-.02, .03

.01 (.01)†
-.04 (.01)*

.07
-.10

-.002, .03
-.06, -.01

.01 (.01)
-.03 (01)*

.05
-.10

-.01, .03
-.06, -.01

.08, .14

σ2 (SE)
.15 (.02)***

.11, .20

σ2 (SE)
.15 (.02)***

b (SE)

-11.15
(1.18)***
.89 (.27)**
-.42 (.50)

Arousal
β

95% CI

b (SE)

-

-13,48 -8.82

.12
-.03

.34, 1.43
-1.41, .57

29.00
(1.55)***
-.25 (.36)
.15 (.66)

125.05,
223.61

σ2 (SE)
298.27
(42.56)***

Valence
β

95% CI

-

25.94, 32.06

-.03
.01

-.96, .47
-1.14, 1.45

Random
effects
Random
Intercept

σ2 (SE)
.11 (.01)***

-

† p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

-

-

.12, .20

σ2 (SE)
167.22
(24.79)***

-

225.50,
394.52
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Table 4
MLM fixed unstandardized and standardized regression weights, standard error, t-values, p-values,
and confidence intervals in blocks 1 and 2 predicting arousal with GAD moderating.
Predictor /
Block
Covariate
1
b (SE)
β
t
p
95%CI
b (SE)
β
[LL, UL]
Fixed Effects
Intercept
-3.85 (2.49)
-.01a
-1.57
.124
-8.76, 1.07
-3.29 (2.47)
-.02a
Dep Sxs
.76 (.26)
.10
-.36
.004
.24, 1.28
.68 (.26)
.09
GAD Sxs

-.17 (.49)

-.01

2.90

.719

MP-D
MP-C

.26 (3.10)
14.01 (3.33)

.00
.37

.08
4.21

.934
< .001

MP-I

-6.99 (3.30)

-.17

-2.12

.036

PC-D

-6.66 (.94)

-.13

-7.06

PC-C
PC-I

5.20 (.90)
2.82 (1.06)

.12
.06

5.76
2.66

2
t

p

95%CI
[LL, UL]

-1.33
2.62

.185
.010

-8.17, 1.69
.17, 1.20

-1.13, .78

-1.46 (.89)

.00

-1.64

.103

-3.21, .30

-5.87, 6.39
7.43, 20.58

.05 (3.15)
14.28 (3.27)

.00
.38

.02
4.37

.986
< .001

-6.17, 6.28
7.83, 20.74

-13.50, -.47

-5.72 (3.28)

-.14

-1.74

.083

-12.21, .76

< .001

-8.53, -4.80

-6.67 (.95)

-.13

-7.05

< .001

-8.54, -4.80

< .001
.009

3.42, 6.98
.73, 4.92

5.21 (.90)
2.84 (1.06)

.12
.06

5.78
2.69

< .001
.008

3.43, 7.00
.75, 4.93

MP-D * GAD
MP-C * GAD

-

-

-.30 (1.04)
-.68 (1.12)

-.02
-.05

-.29
-.61

.776
.545

-2.34, 1.75
-2.96, 1.53

MP-I * GAD
PC-D * GAD

-

-

-1.64 (1.00)
-.05 (.31)

-.12
-.01

-1.63
-.15

.104
.881

-3.62, .34
-.67, .57

PC-C * GAD
PC-I * GAD

-

-

.09 (.30)
-.37 (.36)

-.00
-.02

.29
-1.03

.774
.303

-.51, .69
-1.08, .34

AIC
44932.86
44938.40
Note: Statistically significant results are presented in bold. PC = person-centered; Dep = depression; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Sxs =
symptoms. MP = mean perceived; PC = person-centered; D = dominant behavior; C = cold behavior; I = immoral behavior; AIC = Akaike’s
Information Criterion; anon-significant.
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Table 5
MLM fixed unstandardized and standardized regression weights, standard error, t-values, p-values, and confidence intervals in blocks 1
and 2 predicting valence with GAD moderating.
Predictor /
Block
Covariate
1
2
b (SE)
β
t
p
95%CI
b (SE)
β
t
p
95%CI
[LL, UL]
[LL, UL]
Fixed Effects
Intercept
12.54 (2.90)
-.01a
4.32
< .001
6.80, 18.28
12.53 (2.84)
-.01a
4.42
< .001
6.93, 18.13
Dep Sxs

.03 (.31)

.00

.10

.921

-.58, .64

.06 (.30)

.01

.19

.849

-.54,.65

GAD Sxs

-.79 (.57)

-.05

-1.40

.165

-1.91, .33

.33 (1.02)

-.06

.32

.748

-1.69, 2.34

MP-D

-8.02 (3.62)

-.15

-2.22

.028

-15.16, -.88

-7.91 (3.61)

-.15

-2.19

.030

-15.04, -.78

MP-C

-12.53 (3.88)

-.27

-3.23

.001

-20.19, -4.88

-12.73 (3.75)

-.27

-3.40

.001

-20.13, -5.33

MP-I

-14.10 (3.85)

-.29

-3.67

< .001

-21.70, -6.51

-13.81 (3.77)

-.29

-3.67

< .001

-21.25, -6.38

PC-D

-5.49 (.84)

-.09

-6.53

< .001

-7.16, -3.83

-5.48 (.84)

-.09

-6.48

< .001

-7.15, -3.80

PC-C

-14.01 (.89)

-.27

-15.82

< .001

-15.76, -12.26

-13.99 (.88)

-.27

-15.82

< .001

-15.73, -12.24

PC-I

-19.42 (.94)

-.35

-20.56

< .001

-21.29, -17.56

-19.43 (.94)

-.35

-20.78

< .001

-21.27, -17.58

MP-D * GAD

-

-

-

-

-

.23 (1.19)

.01

.19

.849

-2.12, 2.57

MP-C * GAD
MP-I * GAD
PC-D * GAD
PC-C * GAD

-

-

-

-

-

3.84 (1.28)
-3.17 (1.15)
-.19 (.28)
.30 (.30)

.25
-.19
-.01
.01

3.00
-2.76
-.67
1.00

.003
.006
.503
.320

1.31, 6.38
-5.43, -.90
-.74, .37
-.29, .88

PC-I * GAD

-

-

-

-

-

-.47 (.32)

-.03

-1.49

.139

-1.10, .16

AIC
44423.578
44421.864
Note: Statistically significant results are presented in bold. PC = person-centered; Dep = depression; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Sxs = symptoms.
MP = mean perceived; PC = person-centered; D = dominant behavior; C = cold behavior; I = immoral behavior; AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. anonsignitificant.

